Being Perceived and Being “Seen”: Interpersonal Affordances, Agency, and Selfhood

Abstract

Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions, and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further on this foundation for understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents, the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically: there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self.

All Affordances Are Social: Foundations of a Gibsonian Social Ontology

“…The setting is sometimes lost sight of by interaction theorists. A recent paper by Brancazio (2020) attempts to combine affordance theory with the enactive theory of participatory sense-making, according to which interacting groups of organisms form autonomous self-sustaining units (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007;Di Paolo et al, 2018). Brancazio avoids the term 'social affordance' on the grounds that it is too broadly defined.…”

“…She introduces the term 'interpersonal affordance', which she defines as 'opportunities afforded by other agents.' Brancazio suggests that the perception of interpersonal affordances is 'different from the perception of environmental affordances' (Brancazio, 2020). The difference, according to Brancazio, is that perceiving interpersonal affordances involves the recognition of the agency of the other, which is absent for actions performed with reference to inanimate objects.…”

“…Identity labels themselves are merely symbols, yet one's identity affects which affordances in the environment will be available and relevant, and which cultural practices one will learn to participate in. Identity is bound up with questions of power, status, duty, solidarity (Brancazio, 2020).…”

“…The term 'social affordance' is sometimes used by researchers working within the ecological framework (McArthur and Baron, 1983;Valenti and Gold, 1991;Loveland, 1991;Marsh et al, 2006;Schmidt, 2007;Rietveld et al, 2019). The term is also coming to be commonly used by researchers working outside the ecological framework, within the broader cognitive sciences (e.g., Schilbach et al, 2013;Ramstead et al, 2016;Veissière et al, 2020;Brancazio, 2020). A succinct descriptive definition that captures the various ways in which the term 'social affordance' has been used is provided by de Carvalho (2020): 'Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.…”

Review of Rob Withagen, Affective Gibsonian Psychology, New York: Routledge, 2022

“…Perhaps the first speaker fears the situation because he knows his arguments will be unpopular. Describing the structure of the social environment is a difficult project, and it requires us to recognize that in addition to perceiving other people, we also interact with one another's bodies and extended selves (Baggs, 2021;Brancazio, 2020).…”