Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing

Annas, Julia

doi:10.2307/3219725

Cited by 118 publications

(47 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…On the principle-centered views McDowell opposes, the virtuous person can offer a reason for his action that is rationally compelling (and ipso facto readily intelligible) to any 24 This point is developed in different ways by Hursthouse 1999, pp 220-221, Merritt 2000, Annas 2004and Chappell 2005 As for instance when Robert Louden says, "Within the context of a polis … the strategy of pointing to a phronimos makes a certain sense. However, to divorce this strategy from its social and economic roots and then to apply it to a very different sort of community-one where people really do not know each other all that well, and where there is wide disagreement on values-does not.…”

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 95%

Virtue and Disagreement

Clarke

2009

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

One of the most prominent strands in contemporary work on the virtues consists in the attempt to develop a distinctive-and compelling-account of practical reason on the basis of Aristotle's ethics. In response to this project, several eminent critics have argued that the Aristotelian account encourages a dismissive attitude toward moral disagreement. Given the importance of developing a mature response to disagreement, the criticism is devastating if true. I examine this line of criticism closely, first elucidating the features of the Aristotelian account that motivate it, and then identifying two further features of the account that the criticism overlooks. These further features show the criticism to be entirely unwarranted. Once these features are acknowledged, a more promising line of criticism suggests itself-namely, that the Aristotelian account does too little to help us to resolve disputes-but that line of objection will have to be carried out on quite different grounds.The way in which we understand a given kind of disagreement, and explain it, has important practical effects. It can modify our attitude to others and our understanding of our own outlook. In relation to other people, we need a view of what is to be opposed, rejected, and so forth, and in what spirit; for ourselves, disagreement can raise a warning that we may be wrong, and if truth or correctness is what we are after, we may need to reform our strategies (Williams 1985, p 133).

show abstract

Section: 2mentioning

confidence: 95%

Virtue and Disagreement

Clarke

2009

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…4 See for example(Williams 1995) and(Williams 1993). An interesting discussion of these points can be found in(Scanlon 2003).5 For an interesting discussion of moral authority see(Annas 2004). Related themes are discussed in (Abou el-Fadl 2001).…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Possessing Moral Concepts

Merli

2009

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers' eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts.

show abstract

“…Julia Annas, for one, insists on bringing out the particular sense in which a theory of right action tells me what to do (Annas, 2004). She compares John's and Dick's case (Annas, 2004, p. 65).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Why helping the victims of disasters makes me a better person: Towards an anthropological theory of humanitarian action

Kalokairinou

2016

Human Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I examine which is the most appropriate moral theory for dealing with disaster bioethics contexts. It is pointed out that, contrary to what is usually believed, moral theories of right action cannot actually guide us in such difficult situations. Instead, it is claimed that a virtue ethics theory of an Aristotelian version, which gives emphasis not only on the virtuous person but also on the relevant developmental process of becoming virtuous, can provide us with the right theoretical framework for coping with the problems which the victims of such disastrous situations face.

show abstract

Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing

Cited by 118 publications

References 0 publications

Virtue and Disagreement

Virtue and Disagreement

Possessing Moral Concepts

Why helping the victims of disasters makes me a better person: Towards an anthropological theory of humanitarian action

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About