Belief and Acceptance

Knowledge entails dispositional belief

“…The entailment is not 1 One might think that knowledge involves additional arguments such as a contrast proposition (Schaffer 2005), or that knowledge is not a relation to a proposition or some other representation of reality but rather to a fact or some other portion of reality itself (Vendler 1972). 2 One might think that the relevant pro-attitude is acceptance rather than belief (Cohen 1989), or that belief involves additional arguments such as a degree argument (a view that traces back at least to Locke's Essays, Book 4, Chaps. [15][16][17][18][19], or that the relevant object of belief is related to but still different from the object of knowledge (for instance, Vendler 1978, p. 86) says of ''the venerable formula: x knows that p iff x believes that p, p, and (something or other)'' that he only asks for it to be amended to ''x knows that p iff x believes that 'p', etc.…”

Belief, Acceptance, and What Happens in Groups

“…15 That this is so is clear enough from his discussion in, say, (Cohen 1989) where all of the initial expository examples concern individual human beings. He is, of course, operating in the context of a long epistemological tradition in philosophy and cognitive science that betrays no interest in the collective case.…”

“…3 See, e.g. (Gilbert 1987;Gilbert 1989;Tuomela 1992;Clark 1994;Schmitt 1994;Cohen 1995;Tuomela 2000;Wray 2001;McMahon 2002;Tollefsen 2002;Bouvier 2004;Mathiesen 2006;Pettit 2010). 4 We take social epistemology to be something of a mongrel category depending on how it is interpreted.…”

Formal Learning Theory in Context

“…The distinction between acceptance and personal probabilities (belief) has been explained diversely by different authors (Popper, 1959;Cohen, 1992;Maher, 1993;Levi, 1967;Kaplan, 1998). We rely here on just a few observations.…”