“…However, as Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi have argued, ‘this observation does not take us very far’:It is acceptable to say ‘Sara’s belief is true’, ‘John’s assertion is false’, but note that it is equally acceptable to say ‘what Sara believes is correct,’ and ‘what John said is incorrect’ So, it is neither a solecism to apply ‘true’ to a belief nor ‘correct’ to a proposition when it is picked out by a noun clause such as ‘what John said/believed’. (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, , p. 104)…”
Section: IIImentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Bykvist and Hattiangadi remark, the OED 's definition of ‘correct’ indicates that this word ‘is standardly used to mean either “in accordance with acknowledged or conventional standard” or “in accordance with fact or truth”’. Therefore, to view ‘correct’ as a monosemous ‘and essentially normative term does not square well with common usage’ (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, , p. 103).…”
It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct-making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p.
K E Y W O R D Sbelief's standard of correctness, norm of belief, normativity of truth
“…However, as Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi have argued, ‘this observation does not take us very far’:It is acceptable to say ‘Sara’s belief is true’, ‘John’s assertion is false’, but note that it is equally acceptable to say ‘what Sara believes is correct,’ and ‘what John said is incorrect’ So, it is neither a solecism to apply ‘true’ to a belief nor ‘correct’ to a proposition when it is picked out by a noun clause such as ‘what John said/believed’. (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, , p. 104)…”
Section: IIImentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Bykvist and Hattiangadi remark, the OED 's definition of ‘correct’ indicates that this word ‘is standardly used to mean either “in accordance with acknowledged or conventional standard” or “in accordance with fact or truth”’. Therefore, to view ‘correct’ as a monosemous ‘and essentially normative term does not square well with common usage’ (Bykvist & Hattiangadi, , p. 103).…”
It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct-making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p.
K E Y W O R D Sbelief's standard of correctness, norm of belief, normativity of truth
“…Let me start by considering two previous attempts at answering Bykvist and Hattiangadi's challenge. Since I believe that Bykvist and Hattiangadi have replied to these attempts convincingly (forthcoming), my comments will be brief.…”
Section: Previous Solutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the conjunctive blindspots are “omissive” Moorean propositions, “commissive” Moorean propositions are of the following sort: ( r and B ¬ r ). Bykvist and Hattiangadi have pointed out that these are problematic as well (forthcoming). Suppose that S considers (c) which is true: (c) It is raining and S believes that it is not raining.Since neither (c) nor either of the conjuncts would be false if S believed any of the true and considered propositions in question, (ACT 1) implies that S ought believe all of them.…”
According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between those true propositions we are obliged to believe ("ordinary non-tricky propositions") and those we are not ("tricky propositions"). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative.
“…This view has been defended by, amongst others, Hacker : 123, Hattiangadi : 224, Thomson : 250, Bykvist & Hattiangadi . Hegel is a precursor of this view ( Enzyklopädie, Wissenschaft der Logik [1830], §213; §172; §24 n. 2).…”
Some philosophers have argued that a standard of correctness is constitutive of the concept or the essence of belief. By this claim they mean, roughly, that a mental state is a belief partially in virtue of being correct if and only if its content is true. In this paper I provide a new argument in support of the constitutivity of the correctness standard for belief. I first argue that the standard expresses a conceptual necessity. Then I argue that, since conceptual necessities are such in virtue of some concept, the standard must also be necessary in virtue of some concept. Finally, I provide an argument by exclusion to the effect that the standard is necessary in virtue of the concept of belief.
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