Belief, Truth and Knowledge

Armstrong, D. M.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511570827

Cited by 792 publications

(144 citation statements)

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“…In everyday language, the term belief has a connotation of something like faith. In scientific contexts, however, belief means something different: (theories of) epistemology (Armstrong 1973;Hintikka 1962). Within epistemological theories, beliefs are usually thought of as certain kinds of propositional attitudes.…”

Section: A2 What Are Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy)

Kovic¹,

Kristiansen

2017

Journal of Risk Research

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The gambler's fallacy is the irrational belief that prior outcomes in a series of events affect the probability of a future outcome, even though the events in question are independent and identically distributed. In this paper, we argue that in the standard account of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy can arise: The irrational belief that all beliefs pertaining to the probabilities of sequences of outcomes constitute the gambler's fallacy, when, in fact, they do not. Specifically, the odds of the probabilities of some sequences of outcomes can be epistemically rational in a given decision-making situation. Not only are such odds of probabilities of sequences of outcomes not the gambler's fallacy, but they can be implemented as a simple heuristic for avoiding the gambler's fallacy in risk-related decision-making. However, we have to be careful not to fall prey to a variant of the gambler's fallacy, the gambler's fallacy fallacy (fallacy), in which we do not calculate odds for the probabilities of sequences that matter, but rather simply believe that the raw probability for the occurrence of a sequence of outcomes is the probability for the last outcome in that sequence.

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Section: A2 What Are Beliefs?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy)

Kovic¹,

Kristiansen

2017

Journal of Risk Research

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“…Even if one were able to identify a commonality between two objects that they could call x, there is no good way to objectively determine how the same x is manifested in distinct objects, e.g., how blue would be applied to the two objects a and b, but not the third object, c, without entering into infinite regress, i.e., without necessitating reason or evidence to justify each parameter and more reason and evidence to support that reason and evidence, etc. (Armstrong, 1973).…”

Section: A Survey Of Antirealist Views On Propertiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Properties, Direction of Fit and an Argument for Property Realism

Rapp

2015

IJURCA

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There is much debate about the existence of properties and how to consider both tropes and universals. While the antirealist contends that there are no true universal properties, the realist affirms that there are mind-independent universal properties. In this essay I present an argument for the realist approach to the problem of universals based off of the concept of direction of fit. After beginning with a discussion of properties, I discuss antirealist approaches to explaining the problem of universals, arguing that there are inherent problems with antirealism about properties that render it unsatisfactory. It becomes clear that universals must exist, since a mind-to-world direction of fit is necessary to enable the mind to interact with the world.

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“…I would say it differently: Knowledge has special standing in logic. 27 See here Armstrong (1973), Goldman (1967Goldman ( ), (1973, Stich and Nisbett (1980), Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984, Goldman (1986Goldman ( ), (1992, Nozick (1986), Stich (1990), Plantinga (1993) and Trout and Bishop (2005). It all began with Ramsey (1931).…”

Section: Cognitive Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Advice on the Logic of Argument

Woods

2013

RHV

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ResumenDesde su creación moderna a principios de la década de los 70, la lógica informal ha puesto un especial énfasis en el análisis de las falacias y los esquemas de diálogo argumentativo. Desarrollos simultáneos en los círculos que se ocupan de los actos de comunicación de habla exhiben una concentración en el carácter dialéctico de la discusión. PALABRAS CLAVE: Lógica informal, argumento, diálogos AbstractSince its modern inception in the early 1970s, informal logic has placed a special emphasis on the analysis of fallacies and argumentative dialogue schemes. Concurrent developments in speech communication circles exhibit a like concentration on the dialectical character of argument.

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Belief, Truth and Knowledge

Cited by 792 publications

References 0 publications

The gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy)

The gambler’s fallacy fallacy (fallacy)

Properties, Direction of Fit and an Argument for Property Realism

Advice on the Logic of Argument

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