Belief without credence

Carter, J. Adam; Jarvis, Benjamin W.; Rubin, Katherine

doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6

Cited by 14 publications

(24 citation statements)

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“…17 As James (1897) puts it: 'There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion […] We must know the truth; and we must avoid error-these are our first and great commandments […]' For more contemporary expressions of this idea, see Alston (1985), Foley (1987), David (2001), Fallis (2006). See also Carter et al ( , 2013. 18 Or-in Smith (2014) terminology-if these aims were normatively coincident-viz., if they were such that one could not aim at one without automatically aiming at the other (2014, p. 273).…”

Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…23 Saying there is no difference is of course not a viable 19 Sosa, in Chapter 8, revisits the eye exam case, and in his discussion, he notes that suspecting and assuming are kinds of guesses, guesses without affirmation. It's not clear to me whether suspecting, on the model advanced in Carter et al (2013), should be thought of a non-affirmative attempt at attaining the truth, or rather, as a way of affirming which differs from ordinary (belief-based) affirming in the way that the twin goals of representing truly and not-representing are weighted. 20 On Sosa's model, there are two primary varieties of belief: functional beliefs and judgments.…”

Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…20 On Sosa's model, there are two primary varieties of belief: functional beliefs and judgments. The discussion of belief, in this section and with reference to the model advanced in Carter et al (2013), pertains to belief, per se. 21 As it was suggested, misrepresenting because one is deceived by an evil Cartesian demon is an example of an error possibility that is tolerable for belief, but not for the attitude of being absolutely certainty.…”

Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing

Carter

2016

Synthese

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In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Sosa (Judgment and Agency, 2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cognitive performance of judging. Sosa's examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, I think the source of the disanalogy is a problematic picture of the cognitive performance of guessing and its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of argument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed, and yet remains compatible with Sosa's broader framework.

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Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Guessing the Truth Aim And Defeatmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing

Carter

2016

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“…This is just a sketch of some of the core elements of a more detailed view that has been defended in Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin ().…”

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confidence: 99%

“…A more comprehensive account of this proposal is offered in Carter et al () and Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin ().…”

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On behalf of controversial view agnosticism

Carter

2018

European J of Philosophy

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Controversial view agnosticism (CVA) is the thesis that we are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality, and politics. Given that one's social identity is in no small part of a function of one's positive commitments in controversial areas, CVA has unsurprisingly been regarded as objectionably "spineless." That said, CVA seems like an unavoidable consequence of a prominent view in the epistemology of disagreement-conformism-according to which the rational response to discovering that someone you identify as an epistemic peer or expert about p disagrees with you vis-à-vis p is to withhold judgment. This paper proposes a novel way to maintain the core conciliatory insight without devolving into an agnosticism that is objectionably spineless. The approach offered takes as a starting point the observation that-for reasons that will be made clear -the contemporary debate has bypassed the issue of the reasonableness of maintaining, rather than giving up, representational states weaker than belief in controversial areas. The new position developed and defended here explores this overlooked space; what results is a kind of controversial view agnosticism that is compatible with the kinds of commitments that are integral to social identity. | INTRODUCTIONSuppose you believe that Marilyn Monroe was born before Queen Elizabeth II, and-as you just now find out-I believe that Queen Elizabeth II was born before Marilyn Monroe; prior to our disagreement, we each reckoned the other to be equally likely to be right on this matter-namely, we each took the other to be epistemic peers 1 on matters of 20th century celebrity birthdates. 2 A popular position in recent social epistemology insists that, in situations like the one just described, rationality requires that both parties should "move to the centre." Call here, following Lackey (2008), positions that embrace this general insight about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement conformist views and the general position embraced conformism. In a bit more detail:This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made. ? These issues continue to be explored, 10 though in what follows I will be taking a different tack. I will argue that controversial view agnosticism-or at least, a version of it-is true, but that facts about expert (rather than peer) disagreement ultimately provide the most compelling kind of support for the position. I will then proceed to show how the version of controversial view agnosticism I think we should accept is not as objectionable as we would initially be let to think. In order to get the argument up and running, it is important to first look more closely at some of the assumptions lurking in the background of ...

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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism

Satta

2022

Erkenn

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Belief without credence

Cited by 14 publications

References 73 publications

Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing

Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing

On behalf of controversial view agnosticism

A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism

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