Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3652318

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…My models can be validated using data from experiments or surveys. For example, the methods of experimental economics can be used to elicit beliefs about the actions and attitudes of others (d 'Adda et al, 2020, Górges and Nosenzo, 2020, Gill and Rosokha, 2020, Andreozzi et al, 2020, Szekely et al, 2021. For example, d 'Adda et al (2020) measured subjects' actions and beliefs corresponding to my variables x, y,x andỹ in a single round of the Dictator game while Szekely et al (2021) did the same for a group of subjects playing a collective risk game (Milinski et al, 2008) over 28 rounds.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution of actions, personal norms and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Gavrilets

2021

Evolut. Hum. Sci.

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Human decision-making is affected by a diversity of factors including material cost-benefit considerations, normative and cultural influences, learning, and conformity with peers and external authorities (e.g., cultural, religious, political, organizational). Also important are their dynamically changing personal perception of the situation and beliefs about actions and expectations of others as well as psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance, and social projection. To better understand these processes, I develop a unifying modeling framework describing the joint dynamics of actions and attitudes of individuals and their beliefs about actions and attitudes of their groupmates. I consider which norms get internalized and which factors control beliefs about others. I predict that the long-term average characteristics of groups are largely determined by a balance between material payoffs and the values promoted by the external authority. Variation around these averages largely reflects variation in individual costs and benefits mediated by individual psychological characteristics. The efforts of an external authority to change the group behavior in a certain direction can, counter-intuitively, have an opposite effect on individual behavior. I consider how various factors can affect differences between groups and societies in tightness/looseness of their social norms. I show that the most important factors are social heterogeneity, societal threat, effects of the authority, cultural variation in the degree of collectivism/individualism, the population size, and the subsistence style. My results can be useful for achieving a better understanding of human social behavior, historical and current social processes, and in developing more efficient policies aiming to modify social behavior.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution of actions, personal norms and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Gavrilets

2021

Evolut. Hum. Sci.

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show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolution of actions, personal norms, and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Gavrilets¹

2021

Preprint

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Human decision-making is affected by a diversity of factors including material cost-benefit considerations, normative and cultural influences, learning, and conformity with peers and external authorities (e.g., cultural, religious, political, organizational). Also important are their dynamically changing personal perception of the situation and beliefs about actions and expectations of others as well as psychological phenomena such as cognitive dissonance, and social projection. To better understand these processes, I develop a modeling framework describing the joint dynamics of actions and attitudes of individuals and their beliefs about actions and attitudes of their group-mates. I consider which norms get internalized and which factors control beliefs about others. I predict that the long-term average characteristics of groups are largely determined by a balance between material payoffs and the values promoted by the external authority. Variation around these averages largely reflects variation in individual costs and benefits mediated by individual psychological characteristics. The efforts of an external authority to change the group behavior in a certain direction can, counter-intuitively, have an opposite effect on individual behavior. I consider how various factors can affect differences between groups and societies in tightness/looseness of their social norms. I show that the most important factors are social heterogeneity, societal threat, effects of the authority, cultural variation in the degree of collectivism/individualism, the population size, and the subsistence style. My results can be useful for achieving a better understanding of human social behavior, historical and current social processes, and in developing more efficient policies aiming to modify social behavior

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“…For example, research suggests that cooperation is more abundant when it is risk-dominant; in this case, risk-dominance means that players prefer to cooperate when they think it is equally likely that the co-player adopts ALLD or GRIM (Blonski et al, 2011;Dal Bó & Fréchette, 2011). In particular, a higher reward R leads to more cooperation (Gill & Rosokha, 2020), and a higher temptation T leads to less cooperation. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2019) noted that when the reward is low, players are more likely to open with a defection on the first round.…”

Section: Dynamics In the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmamentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct reciprocity among humans

Rossetti,

Hilbe

2023

Ethology

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Direct reciprocity is the tendency to repay others' cooperation. This tendency can be crucial to maintain cooperation in evolving populations. Once direct reciprocity evolves, individuals have a long‐run interest to cooperate, even if it is costly in the short run. The major theoretical framework to describe reciprocal behavior is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Over the past decades, this game has been the major workhorse to predict when reciprocal cooperation ought to evolve, and which strategies individuals are supposed to adopt. Herein, we compare these predictions with the empirical evidence from experiments with human subjects. From a theory‐driven perspective, humans represent an ideal test case, because they give researchers the most flexibility to tailor the experimental design to the assumptions of a model. Overall, we find that theoretical models describe well in which situations people cooperate. However, in the important case of “indefinitely repeated games,” they have difficulties to predict which strategies people use.

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Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract: Beliefs, learning, and personality in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma CAGE working paper no. 489

Cited by 9 publications

References 87 publications

Coevolution of actions, personal norms and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Coevolution of actions, personal norms and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Coevolution of actions, personal norms, and beliefs about others in social dilemmas

Direct reciprocity among humans

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