Beliefs, social identity, and the view of opponents in Swedish carnivore management policy

Abstract

In the policy sciences, the intractability of disputes in natural resource governance is commonly explained in terms of a "devil shift" between rival policy coalitions. In a devil shift, policy actors overestimate the power of their opponents and exaggerate the differences between their own and their opponents' policy beliefs. While the devil shift is widely recognized in policy research, knowledge of its causes and solutions remains limited. Drawing insights from the advocacy coalition framework and social identity theory, we empirically explore beliefs and social identity as two potential drivers of the devil shift. Next, we investigate the potential of collaborative venues to decrease the devil shift over time. These assumptions are tested through statistical analyses of longitudinal survey data targeting actors involved in three policy subsystems within Swedish large carnivore management. Our evidence shows, first, that the devil shift is more pronounced if coalitions are defined by shared beliefs rather than by shared identity. Second, our study shows that participation in collaborative venues does not reduce the devil shift over time. We end by proposing methodological and theoretical steps to advance knowledge of the devil shift in contested policy subsystems.

Modelling stakeholder satisfaction for conflict resolution in wildlife management: a case of wolf population in Sweden

“…This paper presents a stakeholder analysis supplemented by illustrative modelling for systematic analysis of the conflicting drivers related to the wolf management issue in Sweden. In this case, the conservation conflict not only relates to the economical and physical loss but also touches some deeper and more profound issues regarding identity, respect, value, trust, and historical conflicts between different social groups (Eriksson 2017a, b;Sandström 2011, 2013;Nilsson et al 2020;Eriksson et al 2015;Sjölander-Lindqvist 2008). Strong policies, such as a hunting ban and economic compensation, can only scratch the surface of the conflict and the effect is only for short-term.…”

“…The conflicts around wolf conservation are partly rational and partly emotional. In most forms of meeting with stakeholders from different perspectives, no matter from which side, emotional debates always upgrade the conflict and distort efforts at consensus building and peace-making (Eriksson 2017a, b;Sandström 2011, 2013;Nilsson et al 2020;Eriksson et al 2015;Skogen and Krange 2020).…”

“…For wolf supporters, primary drivers are concerns for ecosystem health, conservation and biodiversity, ecotourism, etc. (Eriksson 2017a, b;Nilsson et al 2020;Sjölander-Lindqvist 2008). For wolf objectors, primary drivers are economic losses due to predation on livestock, reindeer, and hunting dogs (Ericsson and Heberlein 2003;Skogen and Krange 2020;Treves et al 2013;Williams et al 2002), disturbance on livelihood in the countryside including animal herding and hunting (Schroeder et al 2018;Sjölander-Lindqvist 2011;von Essen and Tickle 2020;Young et al 2015), etc.…”

“…During the last four decades, the reappearance of wolves has induced a series of social problems and contentious debates within the Swedish society (Ericsson and Heberlein 2003;Ednarsson 2006; Karlsson and Sjöström 2007;Eriksson 2013;Stohr and Coimbra 2013;Rogers 2014;Nilsson et al 2020;Skogen and Krange 2020). These debates focus mainly on the impact of wolves on people's lives, primarily hunting and sheep and goat farming, and the necessity and legitimacy of wolf reestablishment.…”

“…Other objectors such as livestock owners and reindeer herders also claim that wolves negatively affect their lives. Advocates of wolf conservation, on the contrary, consider the wolf population as too small due to inbreeding, illegal hunting, and other ecological factors (Eriksson 2017a, b;Nilsson et al 2020;Sjölander-Lindqvist 2008). They strongly oppose any action that encroaches on the existence and welfare of wolves.…”