Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

Quilty‐Dunn, Jake

doi:10.1111/papq.12115

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 77 publications

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“…The failure to integrate one's beliefs and resolve inconsistencies seems to call for multiple fragments. Furthermore, cases of implicit bias (Mandelbaum 2016) and the automaticity of belief acquisition (Mandelbaum 2014;Mandelbaum and Quilty-Dunn 2015;Quilty-Dunn 2015) provide independent grounds for dividing beliefs into fragments. But what explains fragmentation itself?…”

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confidence: 99%

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Quilty‐Dunn

Mandelbaum

2017

Philos Stud

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Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.Keywords Belief Á Dispositions Á Representation Á Dissonance Á Bias Á Inference Dispositionalism about belief has become fashionable once again. As such it deserves a close review. We aim to provide a comprehensive, critical one.

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confidence: 99%

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Quilty‐Dunn

Mandelbaum

2017

Philos Stud

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“…One problem with this argument is that there appear to be many cases in which thoughts conflict, even when the relevant thoughts are both conscious and attended (see, e.g., Gertler, ; Mandelbaum, ; Quilty‐Dunn, ). For instance, superstitious views can persist despite one's better judgment that they are false (Huddleston, ).…”

Section: Objections To the Phenomenal Contrast Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recent issues in high‐level perception

Helton

2016

Philosophy Compass

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Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high-level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach. Suppose there is a cat lounging in a hammock. The weight of the cat's body pushes the fabric of the hammock down, creating a bulge in the bottom of the hammock. 1 In looking at this scene, what do you visually perceive? On one view, you perceive merely the shapes and colors of the cat and of the hammock. On another view, you visually perceive the colors and shapes of the cat and of the hammock, and you additionally perceive the cat as a cat, the hammock as a hammock, and the bulge in the hammock as caused by the weight of the cat. On this latter view, visual perception can represent a range of high-level features, since it can represent features other than the visual domain's paradigmatic low-level features of shape and color. 1 This example is from Siegel (2010, 121).

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“…Just as beliefs and intellectual seemings are distinct, it is also essential to the model I am defending here that perceptual experiences and intellectual seemings are distinct. In other words, I reject the "dual-aspect" view of perceptual experience, according to which the states I am calling "intellectual seemings" are part of our perceptual experiences (see Smith, 2002, andQuilty-Dunn, 2015, for discussion). To explain why my system is to be preferred, it will be helpful to consider a case where three kinds of state are activated-perceptual experience, intellectual seeming, and belief.…”

Section: Intellectual Seemingsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

Gow

2019

European J of Philosophy

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The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.

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Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

Cited by 16 publications

References 77 publications

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Recent issues in high‐level perception

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

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