Believing Things Unknown

McGlynn, Aidan

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00843.x

Cited by 40 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…After that we will 1 The knowledge norm of belief has been advocated by Williamson (2000), Huemer (2007), Sutton (2007), Jackson (2012), Sosa (2011), andLittlejohn (2013) to name a few. For objections against the knowledge norm of belief see McGlynn (2013McGlynn ( , 2014. The safety condition on the other hand has been put forward as a necessary condition for knowledge by Luper (2006), Pritchard (2005Pritchard ( , 2007Pritchard ( , 2012aPritchard ( , 2015, Sosa (1999), and Williamson (2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it Safe to Disagree?

Hirvelä

2016

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This paper offers a new account of the epistemic significance of disagreement which is grounded in two assumptions; (i) that knowledge is the norm of belief and, (ii) that the safety condition is a necessary condition for knowledge. These assumptions motivate a modal definition of epistemic peerhood, which is much easier to operate on than the more traditional definitions of epistemic peerhood. The modal account of the epistemic significance of disagreement yields plausible results regarding cases of disagreement. Furthermore, it is able to tap into the intuitions that have motivated the conformist and the nonconformist positions and it locates a fruitful middle-ground between these two conflicting positions. It will be shown that the conformist is correct in that cases of real peer disagreement force us to suspend our judgment. The reason for this is that in cases of real peer disagreement our beliefs fail to be safe. The nonconformist, on the other hand, is right in that disagreement in itself does not have any epistemic power. It is only by the grace of nature that we gain knowledge. The fact that someone disagrees with you does not mean that you do not have knowledge.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is it Safe to Disagree?

Hirvelä

2016

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“…If there are alternative approaches for internalists to take, they are not well known. 13 For a dissenting view on these cases, see McGlynn (2013).…”

Section: On Positive Infallibility and Negative Self-intimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Note Concerning Justification and Access

Littlejohn¹

2013

Episteme

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Certain combinations of attitudes are manifestly unreasonable. It is unreasonable to believe that dogs bark, for example, if one concedes that one has no justification to believe this. Why are the irrational combinations irrational? One suggestion is that these are attitudes that a subject cannot have justification to have. If this is right, we can test claims about the structure of propositional justification by relying on our observations about which combinations of attitudes constitute Moorean absurd pairs. In a recent defense of access internalism, Smithies argues that only access internalism can explain why various combinations of attitude are irrational. In this paper, I shall argue that access internalism cannot explain the relevant data. Reflection on Moore's Paradox will not tell us much of anything about propositional justification and cannot support access internalism.

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“…For discussion of Moorean absurdity and the rationality of belief, see Adler () and Sorensen (). For dissent, see McGlynn ().…”

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confidence: 99%