Beneath politicization: the unacknowledged constitutional crisis in the Dagbon succession conflict in Ghana

Abstract

The Dagbon succession conflict has been intermittent since the colonial era. What appears to be the most trumpeted thesis in the scholarly works that the conflict has attracted is the overpoliticization of the conflict. While the over-politicization of the conflict is indisputable, this study uncovers the constitutional crisis, which is beneath and motivates the over-politicization of the conflict. Through a critical content analysis of archival and historical documents (commission reports, letters, petitions, minutes, and court rulings, among others), and through secondary data from books, journal articles, and newspapers (both print and electronic), the paper identifies and explores three principal sources of the constitutional crisis, namely, the inadequacy of the 1930 Dagomba Succession Constitution, the lack of legitimacy for the 1948 Amended Dagomba Succession Constitution, and the state's interventions that have deepened the constitutional crisis. Having explained how legal centralism and legal pluralism have been implicated in the conflict, the paper concludes with a dispassionate call for a transformation of the conflict that will acknowledge the constitutional character of the conflict and the need to convene a constitutional conference in which the two royal gates would harmonize their emic perspectives on their succession customs and rules.

When Haste Shakes the Scholar’s Pen: Some Scholarly Works on Dagbon after the Regicide of Yaa-Naa Yakubu Andani II, King of Dagbon, Ghana

“…Moreover, the widening scope of candidature for the chieftaincy institutions that were initially thought to be pagan institutions to include Christians, Muslims, and civil servants has raised the stake of the institutions. These have brought some glory back to the chieftaincy institutions (Bolaji 2016). These preceding factors have compelled some African countries to give certain constitutional backing to the chieftaincy institutions.…”

“…In fact, Lesotho and Swaziland are constitutional monarchies where the chieftaincy institutions are immersed with state although with limited authority. In Ghana, for example, the institutions' affairs have called for a Ministry, known as the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs (Englebert 2002 andBolaji 2016). So what is the nature of the fellowship between the chieftaincy institutions and the African states?…”

“…On the part of the state, some African states have also disreputably invaded the chieftaincy institutions and ignored traditions and customs, thereby enthroning their cronies and dethroning their adversaries. Some examples were Gnassigbe Eyadema's Togo and Sanni Abacha's Nigeria (Englebert 2002;Nolte 2002;Albert 2008;Bolaji 2016).…”

“…The incursion of the political class coupled with the fact that the political class also takes heredity and honouric titles from the chieftaincy institutions has not only increased the stakes in the chieftaincy institutions, but has also created platforms for contestations that go beyond the traditional chieftaincies. From the traditional, commercial, and political arenas, diverse actors characterise these platforms to seek political power and/or boost their political constituencies or economic base through networking and building alliances (Bolaji 2016). The sociological implications of networking and building alliances are so productive for power-seeking individuals because of the social ties and capital prevalent at these platforms.…”

“…Nonetheless, the various governments in Ghana resulting from the unitary system either supported or opposed a gate almost unanimously. The regimes, especially the National Liberation Council (NLC), whose leadership was divided on the conflict, managed their intra-regime differences in support of or opposition against a particular royal gate (Bolaji 2016).…”