Berufsbildungspolitik

Hilbert, Josef; Südmersen, Helmi; Weber, Hajo

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-92649-4

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…5 Germany has a distinctive system of vocational training in roughly 400 nationally certified occupations. Training is subject to corporatist administration by employers associations, labour unions and state agencies (Hilbert et al 1990). Apprenticeships combine elements of school-based and company-based instruction.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions

2004

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This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the postwar period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically-a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German "model" of corporate governance are discussed.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions

2004

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“…Second, we identify collective skill formation systems , in which intermediary organizations such as employers’ associations, but also trade unions and works councils, play a crucial role in the governance of VET (Hilbert et al, 1990; Streeck et al, 1987), and employers have a large influence on the content of training. State actors are also involved in running the system, but their role is of a different nature than in statist systems; rather than providing VET themselves, state actors play the role of moderators (Hilbert et al, 1990: 52) and delegate obligations and competencies to ‘private interest governments’ (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985).…”

Section: Employer Involvement In and Public Commitment To Vetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partisan power, economic coordination and variations in vocational training systems in Europe

Busemeyer

Schlicht-Schmälzle

2014

European Journal of Industrial Relations

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This article explores the variation of vocational education and training systems in Eu ropean countries. From a survey of experts in I 5 European countries, we develop a typology alo ng two dimensions: employer involvement and public commitment. In a second step, we expl ain th e variety of skill formation systems, highlighting the importance of partisan power and econom ic coordination. The causal argument is applied in three illustrative case studies of Germany, Sweden and the UK. In particular, we argue that a high degree of economic coordination in creases the re levance of training relative t o academic educati on. H ow ever, differences within the cluster of coordinated market eco nomi es are related to different legacies of partisan power in t he post-war decades.

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“…Interestingly, unions were initially supportive of what was perceived to be a strengthening of broad, albeit basic skills in the first stage of the apprenticeship. However, it was soon understood that progression to the second training stage depended less on a trainee's choice and more on a company's willingness to provide suitable training opportunities (Hilbert et al , 1990), culminating in successful union attempts to abort the staged apprenticeship model during the 1980s. More recently, the debate on the two‐year apprenticeship model has been reopened.…”

Section: Corporatism and The Political Economy Of Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

German training revisited: an appraisal of corporatist governance

Lange

2012

Education + Training

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Purpose -The aim of this paper is to re-examine the unique political economy of Germany's dual apprenticeship training model and its underlying philosophy of corporatist governance. It responds to recent arguments suggesting that Germany's collectivist skill regime is under threat, increasingly giving way to the introduction of "segmentalism". Design/methodology/approach -The paper reviews the political roots of a training system, which is moulded and shaped by corporatist interventions and neocorporatist compromises. It applies "public choice" theory to different interest groups in Germany's training market. The focus is on the German apprenticeship system as a social and political institution. The paper is positioned in the tradition of inductive enquiry, which draws on an interpretive framework and is informed by reference to a cross-section of the extant literature in several social science disciplines. Findings -The German training system is the product of a wider post-war consensus, yet continues to face social inequality concerns, which culminate in significant economic and societal costs. Despite modernisation attempts, the German apprenticeship is the outcome of a complicated political process, linked to its historical origins, which allows for a considerable degree of self-interest alongside its corporatist roots and values. Amongst Germany's social partners, heterogeneous self-interests and corporatism can co-exist, thus identifying an alternative model to collectivism and segmentalism. Originality/value -The paper rejects recent suggestions that the German system moves towards a model of "segmentalism". Instead, it interprets the German system as an example for a specific socio-political constellation where significant self-interests and corporatist rules can co-exist. Against this background, it demonstrates that continuing demands to copy the German apprenticeship model -if thought desirable -are unlikely to be successful unless this tangled web of political processes and interests is fully understood.

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Berufsbildungspolitik

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions

Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions

Partisan power, economic coordination and variations in vocational training systems in Europe

German training revisited: an appraisal of corporatist governance

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