Between a rock and a hard place of geopolitically sensitive threats – critical incidents and decision inertia

Abstract

Between a rock and a hard place of geopolitically sensitive threats -critical incidents and decision inertia http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/7193/ Article LJMU has developed LJMU Research Online for users to access the research output of the University more effectively. AbstractThis paper analyses the management of high-profile geopolitically sensitive threats (verifying potential terrorist identity, hostage rescue and national/international security). Defining features of such cases include decision makers' ability to prospectively model competing binary (e.g., do/do not use lethal force), categorical (i.e., choosing between options -e.g., ground forces or unmanned weapons system) or ordinal (e.g., level of acceptable collateral damage) future scenarios in which they must select between options and where every outcome looks aversive and high risk (i.e., 'damned if you do or damned if you don't decisions'). A frequent consequence of such prospective calculations is 'decision inertia' (i.e., a failure to execute an important, irrevocable decision resulting in non-optimal consequences), or 'implementation failure' (i.e., a failure to make a choice). This paper provides a theoretical platform from which to view, understand and, most importantly, minimize decision inertia and failures to act. By combining the benefit of the theoretical framework and hindsight knowledge of the analyzed critical incidents, the paper also helps identify past decisional mistakes, areas of improvement, in order to inform live assessment and management of similar geopolitical threats in the future.

Avoidant authority: The effect of organizational power on decision-making in high-uncertainty situations

“…Least-worst decisions require the decision-maker to take decisive action and overcome fear, doubt, and uncertainty to commit to a least-worst choice (Alison et al, 2018;Shortland et al, 2019). However, research has indicated that the process of least-worst decision-making can often become derailed, resulting in decision inertia.…”

Police Perfection: Examining the Effect of Trait Maximization on Police Decision-Making

“…Further, and even more demanding, is the fact that the decision-maker considers that all anticipated outcomes appear equally aversive (or that choosing between the least-worst quickly is very difficult). Examples of least-worst decisions range from emergency responses such as the California Wildfire response, or Grenfell Tower in London, to international crises such as the Syrian Civil war ( Alison et al, 2018 ). What all of these decisions have in common is the lack of “good” options, a need to make a decision within a given (and often short) timeframe, and significant personal, political, and societal consequences.…”

“…First and foremost, least-worst decision-making is often shown to become de-railed, resulting in decision inertia. Decision inertia involves the delaying of the decision-making process through either avoidance, redundant deliberation, or failure to implement a decision ( Alison et al, 2018 ). In many applied situations the failure to make a decision in time (or at all), is as damaging, if not worse, than an incorrect decision ( Shortland et al, 2019 ).…”

“…Naturalistic research -research which involves the observation of live decision-making (Klein, 1998) -has taken two forms. Firstly, researchers have observed the nature and occurrence of least-worst within real (or simulated) decision-making situations such as counter-terrorist operations, or responses to natural disasters (Alison et al, 2013b(Alison et al, , 2015(Alison et al, , 2017van den Heuvel et al, 2014;Power and Alison, 2017a,b). Secondly, researchers have interviewed decision-makers about the process that they went through when making a leastworst decision.…”

Identifying challenges to critical incident decision-making through a macro-, meso-, and micro- lens: A systematic synthesis and holistic narrative analysis

“…This realization appears to be in direct conflict with the core purpose of the CCS, as the lessons learnt only serve to remind multi-agency systems and individual response agencies of their potentially transgressive actions. In other words, lesson learned do not necessarily translate to effective future decision-making, as decisions are often found to be made in context to an incident (Rebera and Rafalowski, 2014), as agencies focus toward least-worst decisions, rather than optimal outcomes (Alison et al, 2018). The reformation of centralized governing bodies highlights insufficiencies of UK government emergency response management structures (Kapucu, 2009).…”