Between global collaboration and national competition: Unraveling the many faces of Arctic science diplomacy

Abstract

It has been argued that science diplomacy (SD) helps avoid or mitigate conflicts among stakeholders in the Arctic. Yet underlying some of these well-intended and sometimes successful initiatives is a one-sided understanding of SD. The most recent literature takes a more differentiated approach towards the means and ends of SD. It shows that international scientific interaction is shaped by the twofold logic of competition and collaboration. Instruments of SD can be meant to serve national interests, collective regional goals or global agendas. The present paper disentangles these confounding discourses of collaboration and competition based on a conceptually enhanced SD framework. It analyses Arctic strategies and two cases of Arctic SD, the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation and research activities on Svalbard, to reveal the mechanisms of collaboration and competition in the sphere of international science in relation to security, environment and economy. By pointing out where and how science is currently being used in the Arctic, this article provides (a) a systematic overview of the state of SD in the region and (b) a tool for policy-makers and scientists to assess what impact different facets of SD have in Arctic politics.

Arctic science diplomacy in new geopolitical conditions: From “soft” power to “hard” dialogue?

“…There are practices of science diplomacy in countries that seek to gain a scientific advantage over others, inspired by a competitive spirit. In addition to supporting international scientific cooperation, diplomatic apparatuses pursue policies aimed at attracting foreign talent and access to scientific resources internationally or exert influence through scientific assets and research programmes (Rüffin & Rüland, 2022). Examining these processes in the Arctic, especially in the context of recent geopolitical changes, is an important task for future research.…”

Scoping Arctic expertise: The mismatch between traditional theories of expertise and Indigenous expertise

“…Caymaz (2021) conceptualised science diplomacy as a new form of governance in the Arctic, using Svalbard as a specific example of science cooperative research in the Arctic. Ruffin & Ruland (2022) analysed Arctic strategies and used two cases of Arctic science diplomacy (namely the Agreement of Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation and research activities on Svalbard) to argue that science diplomacy presents mechanisms for collaboration and competition. Indigenous People were not included in these works, but given that there are no Indigenous People on Svalbard, this is not surprising.…”

A comparison of British and German parliamentary discourses on science diplomacy over time

“…Interest in science diplomacy, broadly speaking all activities at the intersection of science and foreign policy (Ruffini, 2017, p. 17), has surged during the past few years, among other things, because some prominent policymakers see it as a means to address the grand challenges of our time (Brown, 2009; Clinton, 2009; Moedas, 2015). So far, existing scholarship on science diplomacy has examined how state actors (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010; Rüffin, 2020; Rüffin & Rüland, 2022) and scientists view science diplomacy (Fähnrich, 2017; Proud, 2018; Rüland, 2023). The perspective of members of parliament (MPs) and, more broadly, political parties has not yet been covered.…”

“…Most recently, Rüffin and Rüland (2022) developed an ‘enhanced’ science diplomacy framework which builds on and combines existing conceptualisations of science diplomacy as well as their critiques (see Table 1). This enhanced framework covers the means‐ends dimension of science diplomacy, as we find it in Flink and Schreiterer's as well as in the AAAS–RS conceptualisation of science diplomacy.…”

“…The latter can be described as a level and mode of engagement at which there is actual worldwide consensus on the need and use of science diplomacy, thus rendering this ideal‐type level exclusively collaborative. By establishing six categories that can be either collaborative or competitive in addition to the three truly collaborative ones, the ‘taxonomy helps identify different facets of SD’ (Rüffin & Rüland, 2022, p. 9) as empirical studies have shown that the line between different types of science diplomacy often become blurred (Copeland, 2016; Penca, 2018; Rüland, 2023). This empirical ambiguity also extends to the question of which actors actually play a role in the science diplomacy domain.…”