Between Normative Visions and Pragmatic Possibilities: The EUropean Politics of State Recognition

Abstract

During the last decades the map of Europe has changed considerably. New claims for independent statehood were brought forward and demanded for recognition. These claims had to be answered by the European Union and its member states. This article evolves around the idea that state recognition is as much a matter of politics as it is of law. It starts from the assumption that 'who we are defines what we see', claiming, that EUropean identity, the images the EU and the member states hold about themselves, shape the mental maps they hold of territories and space. Building on this identity a geopolitical imaginary is formed, which can be defined as ideas, allowing actors to ascribe meaning to territories, establish order in a seemingly chaotic world by means of classification and categorisation and allow to develop strategies for action. The geopolitical imaginary of EUrope contains the vision, that if all states were more like EUrope itself, the world would be a better place: a world determined not by power and coercion, but by rules, norms and values; with conflict mechanisms, not based on the rule of the strongest, but the rule of law; stability, created through common rules, negotiation and economic prosperity; and a determination not to let 'blunt power-politics' prevail. This imaginary shapes the way in which Europe makes meaning of claims for statehood and decides which claims to recognise as legitimate. The different elements of the imaginary sometimes contradict each other: law may have to take the back seat in the quest for stability or justice. Law is open to creative interpretations to allow the 'right' claims for recognition to prevail and the 'wrong' ones to be rejected The tool of recognition is caught between legal arguments and political considerations, between normative visions and pragmatic possibilities.

The EU and Contested Statehood in its Near Abroad: Europeanisation, Actorness and State-building

“…The tools at the disposal of the EU may include 'high politics' diplomatic activity in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) i.e. declarations of independence, states' recognition, mediation in peace accords, negotiated secessions (see Wydra 2018); the deployment of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions (i.e. Kosovo, North Macedonia, Palestine, Serbia, Ukraine) (see Noutcheva 2018, Maass 2019, Dobrescu and Schumacher 2018, Baracani 2019, and Bouris and İşleyen 2018; the enlargement policy/accession process where the EU can use conditionality-related mechanisms (i.e.…”

“…Kosovo, North Macedonia, Palestine, Serbia, Ukraine) (see Noutcheva 2018, Maass 2019, Dobrescu and Schumacher 2018, Baracani 2019, and Bouris and İşleyen 2018; the enlargement policy/accession process where the EU can use conditionality-related mechanisms (i.e. Cyprus and Kosovo which are considered potential candidates) (see Wydra 2018, Noutcheva 2018, Kyris 2018and Baracani 2019 as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) framework which induces tailor made conditionalities for the 16 countries in the EU's eastern and southern neighborhood (see Cebeci 2018, Wydra 2018, Noutcheva 2018, Maass 2019, Dobrescu and Schumacher 2018, Baracani 2019, and Bouris and İşleyen 2018) (see also Bouris and Schumacher 2017). In addition to such established frameworks for the projection of EU external influence, in recent years the proliferation of appointments of EU Special Representatives for flashpoints in its near abroad has widened the scope for policy entrepreneurship and/or the exercise of significant agency by senior EU officials (Adebahr 2009;Grevi 2007;Tolksdorf 2012Tolksdorf , 2013Tolksdorf , 2015.…”

“…Discord among EU member states is usually the rule, rather than the exception, when it comes to state-building and the EU has long been criticised for not being able to 'speak with one voice'. One of the most recent examples includes the case of Kosovo where five EU member states namely Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece have not recognized its independence (see Wydra 2018, Baracani 2019, and Noutcheva 2018.…”

“…It is, therefore, important to 'historicise' each instance of state contestation within the context of the EU's foreign policy learning curve. The case studies examined in this Special Issue offer a great deal of empirical diversity ranging from early stages of the CFSP and the disintegration of Yugoslavia (see Wydra 2018, Noutcheva 2018, and Baracani 2019 to the more recent events in Ukraine (see Maass 2019), North Africa (see Noutcheva 2018) and the Middle East (see Bouris and İşleyen 2018).…”

Catalonia rescaling Spain: Is it feasible to accommodate its “stateless citizenship”?

“…where "stateless citizenship" has manifested in grassroots demonstrations demanding a referendum on the future form of a city-regionalized nation of Catalonia in reference to Spain and the European Union (EU) (Wydra, 2018).…”