Beyond behaviorism, positivism, and neo-institutionalism in economics: a conversation with Deirdre Nansen McCloskey

Abstract

Silvestri interviews McCloskey about her forthcoming book, ‘Beyond Behaviorism, Positivism, and Neo-Institutionalism in Economics’, critical of recent economics, especially of neo-institutionalism. Neo-institutionalism uses the ugly character ‘Herr Max U’ as its central idea: the elevation of Prudence to the only virtue. Institutions are mainly intermediate, not ultimate, causes in society. Ethics, rhetoric, identity, ideology, and ideas matter. McCloskey's turn to defending liberalism is in the background of her critique of behaviorism, positivism, and neo-institutionalism as anti-liberal, reducing the analysis of people to a model of childish slaves. Liberalism is the theory of non-slave adults. Of the big ideas of the past few centuries, only liberalism treats people with suitable dignity, and permits them to have a go, and make others rich. Neo-institutionalism shares the two sins of modern Samuelsonian economics: a devotion of mere existence proofs; and a deviation to arbitrary tests of statistical ‘significance’. And in its tale of a rise of ‘capitalism’, it shares the errors of amateur economic history. The better word for the modern economic world of the Great Enrichment – fully 3,000% increases in real income per person – is ‘innovism’. Neo-institutionalism, as the method of historical economics, must be replaced by ‘Humanomics’.

Perceived Organizational Support as an Antecedent of Knowledge Sharing Behaviors: Achieving Sustainability of Change Management Efforts

“…This study aims to empirically investigate the relationship between the constructs of chosen variables. Hence, we adopted the positivist approach since we have examined the causal relationships (McCloskey & Silvestri, 2021). The study's dependent variables are tacit and explicit knowledge-sharing behaviors, whereas the independent variable is 'perceived organizational-support.…”

Elinor Ostrom on choice, collective action and rationality: a Senian analysis

“…For example, one observer has described Ostrom as viewing people as ‘rational beings in the broadest sense’ who ‘seek to optimise values that are important to them … [and] have the ability to deliberate, to use their conscience, to create forms of morality that give them personal identity insofar as they are connected to others’ (Lara, 2015: 583). In contrast to this emphasis on optimisation, Deirdre McCloskey has described Ostrom as someone who ‘went beyond Max U toward a truly revolutionary humanomics’ (2022: 123) 2 . For Tarko, however, Ostrom's broadening of the notion of rationality does not, in the end, entail a departure from rational choice, understood as the idea that people pursue their individual goals as effectively as they can, given the knowledge available to them and the constraints they have: ‘Ostrom's critique of existing rational choice theories [is] always aimed at improving the rational choice framework’, Tarko (2021: 50) argues, ‘rather than opting for some alternative’.…”

“… 2 McCloskey colourfully describes ‘Max U’ as ‘a narcissistic sociopath intent on maximising his utility subject only to the constraint of the rules of the game. Or not, if he can get away with it’ (2022: 12). McCloskey contrasts this ‘Prudence only’ view with approaches that emphasise ‘the non-prudent virtues … which Amartya Sen gathers under the label of “commitment”’ (2022: 84–85).…”

“…Or not, if he can get away with it’ (2022: 12). McCloskey contrasts this ‘Prudence only’ view with approaches that emphasise ‘the non-prudent virtues … which Amartya Sen gathers under the label of “commitment”’ (2022: 84–85).…”

“… 9 As Deirdre McCloskey (2022: 91) puts it, in a discussion of Searle work, such speech acts ‘give[.] me a reason for action independent of my lazy inclinations and desires.…”