Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers

Kóczy, László Á.

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.08.005

Cited by 31 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Several studies have addressed how voting power affects not just the overall likelihood of change but also the power of individual member states Machover 1997, 2001;Koczy 2012). These considerations also played a prominent role in negotiations on Council reform (Moberg 2002;Norman 2005;König, Warntjen, and Burkhart 2006).…”

Section: The Impact Of Voting Weights On Legislative Decision-making mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

Warntjen

2017

Journal of European Integration

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The impact of votes on Council decision-making is a widely studied subject. A large body of theory supports the contention that more votes, ceteris paribus, translate into more influence. Empirical studies have, however, shown a negative relationship between the voting power of a member state and its bargaining success. Based on a new data set, this study shows empirically that there is a robust positive relationship between the number of votes backing a member state request to change European legislation and its success probability. The analysis is based on all unique member state requests for exemptions, lower standards or longer transitional time periods in the field of environmental policy between the first wave of Eastern Enlargement in 2004 and the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 (N = 216). It also shows that member state requests are often successful, contrary to the image of an unresponsive Brussels.

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Section: The Impact Of Voting Weights On Legislative Decision-making mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

Warntjen

2017

Journal of European Integration

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“…If we dene a cooperative game whose solution concept is the allocation of T among players, we can consider T as the worth of the grand coalition of the game, i.e., v(n) = T , see [23]. The topic of power assessment in EU's Countries has been extensively studied in recent years, and there is still a lively debate on the most suitable power index to be used (see [5], [19], [20]). We avoid delving into such issue which is beyond the scope of our paper.…”

Section: The Basic Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-Factor Inequality Approach to a Transfer Scheme: The Case of Common Agricultural Policy

Палестини

Pignataro

2013

SSRN Journal

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The purpose of this paper is to propose theoretical foundations on the impact of transfer scheme, e.g. Community Agricultural Policy, on income inequality within European Countries. First, we show that ex-post inequality (in the after-transfer distribution) may increase if either initial aggregate income or the amount of scal contributions are suciently high. Second according to welfare ordering, we characterize a multi-factor decomposition of the Atkinson index to gauge the impact of each income source on the inequality prole. Third, we introduce a methodology to construct a cooperative game played by dierent income factors (as net incomes and/or incoming transfers) explicitly measuring the cost of inequality across the population in terms of welfare loss. We nally rely on Banzhaf and Shapley values to determine the marginal contributions of each factor to overall inequality.

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“…Often, however, not all coalitions are listed, but only the rules that must be met for a coalition to be winning. For instance, the European Union has complex rules regarding the number of members and their total population to decide whether a coalition of countries is winning in the European Council (Kóczy, 2011). When calculating power indices, the common approach is to generate the corresponding (simple) cooperative game, apply the values to this game and hence obtain the results.We consider this an unnecessary detour that can be eliminated and this shortcut can, in some cases drastically reduce the required calculations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power Indices Expressed in Terms of Minimal Winning Coalitions

Lange

Kóczy

2012

SSRN Journal

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A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a voting situation and are calculated by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the legislative rules.We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions and derive explicit formulae for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf values. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies the numerical calculations to obtain the indices. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues.

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Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers

Cited by 31 publications

References 14 publications

Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union

A Multi-Factor Inequality Approach to a Transfer Scheme: The Case of Common Agricultural Policy

Power Indices Expressed in Terms of Minimal Winning Coalitions

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