Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Johnson, Joel W.; Hoyo, Verónica

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2011.09.004

Cited by 20 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…xxiv These data come from Johnson and Wallack (2005). Using a measure of mean district magnitude taken from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001) produced very similar results.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements

Rickard

2010

European Journal of International Relations

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A growing body of literature argues that democracies are more likely to comply with international agreements than authoritarian states. However, substantial variation exists in the compliance behaviour of democracies. How can this variation be explained? The same mechanism that links regime type to compliance, namely electoral competition, also explains variation in compliance among democracies. This is because the nature of electoral competition varies across democratic systems. An analysis of democratic GATT/WTO member countries from 1980 to 2003 reveals that governments elected via majoritarian electoral rules and/or single-member districts are more likely to violate GATT/WTO agreements than those elected via proportional electoral rules and/or multi-member districts.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 50%

Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements

Rickard

2010

European Journal of International Relations

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“…The PR-STV system incentivises parties to find ways to promote effective vote allocation across candidates (Johnson and Hoyo, 2012). This is to avoid allocation errors which occur when the collective votes among candidates within a party are enough to win one or more seats but the poor distribution of votes across candidates means the party is unsuccessful.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections

Redmond

Regan

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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“…Combining each of these three characteristics, Carey and Shugart (1995) arrive at an index of particularism, which forms the basis of our variable, Ballot Structure 6 . Data are from Johnson and Wallack's (2010) Database of Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote . Additional data for countries not included in that database were sourced from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) Database on Electoral System Design.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization

Martin

2011

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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What is the relationship between electoral institutions and the internal organization of legislatures? Existing research on the U.S. Congress suggests that electoral incentives shaped by the candidate‐centered nature of congressional elections explain the emergence of strong committees in that legislature. Exploring the issue from a comparative perspective, it is argued that the impact of ballot structure on committee system structure is dependent on how legislators cultivate personal votes. Committees will be stronger when legislators supply fiscal legislative particularism (pork), but weaker when legislators cultivate support by delivering extra‐legislative constituency service. Statistical analysis, combining original data on committee design in 39 democratic legislatures with measures of ballot structure and mechanism to cultivate a personal vote (MCPV), confirms the expectation.

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Beyond personal vote incentives: Dividing the vote in preferential electoral systems

Cited by 20 publications

References 15 publications

Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements

Democratic differences: Electoral institutions and compliance with GATT/WTO agreements

Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections

Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization

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