Beyond six feet: The collective behavior of social distancing

Abstract

In a severe epidemic such as the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing can be a vital tool to stop the spread of the disease and save lives. However, social distancing may induce profound negative social/economic impacts as well. How to optimize social distancing is a serious social, political, as well as public health issue yet to be resolved. This work investigates social distancing with a focus on how every individual reacts to an epidemic, what role he/she plays in social distancing, and how every individual's decision contributes to the action of the population and vice versa. Social distancing is thus modeled as a population game, where every individual makes decision on how to participate in a set of social activities, some with higher frequencies while others lower or completely avoided, to minimize his/her social contacts with least possible social/economic costs. An optimal distancing strategy is then obtained when the game reaches an equilibrium. The game is simulated with various realistic restraints including (i) when the population is distributed over a social network, and the decision of each individual is made through the interactions with his/her social neighbors; (ii) when the individuals in different social groups such as children vs. adults or the vaccinated vs. unprotected have different distancing preferences; (iii) when leadership plays a role in decision making, with a few leaders making decisions while the rest of the population just follow. The simulation results show how the distancing game is played out in each of these scenarios, reveal the conflicting yet cooperative nature of social distancing, and shed lights on a self-organizing, bottom-up perspective of distancing practices.