Beyond the icon: Core cognition and the bounds of perception

Abstract

This paper refines a controversial proposal: That core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they do not, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, and avoids otherwise troubling objections.

by ChristopherPeacockeTHE PRIMACY OF METAPHYSICS. Oxford University Press, 2019, ISBN 978‐0‐19‐883557‐8. 218 pp. $39.95

“…Thus, it will not do in general to attempt to reduce analog representation to iconic representation. (A similar point has been independently made, and further developed, by Clarke, forthcoming. )…”

The perception/cognition distinction

“…that of Burge (2018) and Block (MS), make it effectively synonymous with 'analog' on the mirroring conception. Others treat it as stipulative (Fodor 2007;Clarke 2020), or at least generally true (Green and Quilty-Dunn 2017;, that iconic representations meet a certain 'Picture Principle', not implied by analog mirroring, according to which any part of an iconic representation represents a part of the scene represented by the whole (for example, a part of a picture of a lion would represent, say, its nose). There is also, as we shall see, disagreement whether non-discursive representations necessarily, or even typically, represents several dimensions, such as shape, orientation, and colour, in a holistic, bundled-together manner.…”

Numbers, numerosities, and new directions

“…For one, sub-personal states can differ in format (Marr, 1982), and this implies differences in mode of presentation because computational work is needed to translate between format types. Elsewhere, both of us have argued that ANS representations differ from conceptual thoughts in precisely this way (Beck, 2015; Clarke, forthcoming). But ANS representations are also not purely sub-personal.…”