Biased judgements of fairness in bargaining: A replication in the laboratory

Hippel, Svenja; Hoeppner, Sven

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2019.02.001

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…This tends to increase the negotiator’s reservation price so that the bargaining zone is minimized or eliminated, causing objectively fair proposals by the counterpart to be seen as aggressive or unfair (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997) and creating an impasse (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Babcock, Wang, & Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993). Egocentric perceptions are a result of negotiators weighing objectively ambiguous information in a self-serving manner (Hippel & Hoeppner, 2019). Egocentric perceptions increase with negotiation complexity and motivate a negotiator to incur higher impasse-related costs for both parties (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).…”

Section: Intrapersonal Impasse Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Schweinsberg

Thau

Pillutla

2021

Journal of Management

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Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomena worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators toward agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: If both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions), and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence that suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses.

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Section: Intrapersonal Impasse Causesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Schweinsberg

Thau

Pillutla

2021

Journal of Management

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“…Furthermore, these biased perceptions reduced the settlement rates in subsequent negotiation. A lab study by Hippel and Hoeppner (2019) replicated these findings albeit with weaker effects. In a likely underpowered study, Babcock et al (1997) reported similar bias in the control group, coupled with successful debiasing in the experimental group, which was facilitated by asking the participants to list the weaknesses in their case (p. 917).…”

Section: Past Researchmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…One of the major contributors to unnecessary litigation are parties' overconfident estimates of their chances of prevailing in court (Hippel & Hoeppner, 2019; "role-induced bias"; Loewenstein et al, 1993; "advocacy bias"; Melnikoff & Strohminger, 2020). While a certain measure of this bias in parties who are personally involved can be expected, the same should not be true for their lawyers who ought to be significantly more objective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can you trust your lawyer's call? Legal advisers exhibit myside bias resistant to debiasing interventions

Jeklic

2023

J Empirical Legal Studies

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In a vast majority of disputes, settlement is superior to litigation, which involves uncertainty, legal fees, and opportunity cost. Unnecessary litigation also causes judicial backlog, wastes resources, and increases societal conflict. Major contributors to the lack of settlement are intransigent litigants who harbor overoptimistic predictions of litigation outcomes, even though they are looking at identical facts and applicable law. A study (N = 166) found significant myside bias in the participants' predictions of a judicial award (claimants' advisers expected awards that were 69% higher than defendants' advisers) and in their evaluation of arguments (both sides thought the arguments supporting their side were 30% more convincing than the arguments supporting their counterparty). Debiasing interventions-alerting to the myside bias, considering the perspective of the counterparty and dialectical bootstrapping-reduced the bias but did not eliminate it. Exploratory investigation indicated that a large proportion of advisers exhibited naïve realism and bias blind spot, and that cognitive reflection provided a limited measure of resistance to myside bias.

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“…In all of these contributions, biases in fairness views are induced by direct monetary incentives. Self-serving fairness views have also been documented in bargaining contexts, contributing to bargaining impasse between parties who do not sufficiently appreciate the other side's arguments (Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992;Loewenstein et al, 1993;Babcock et al, 1995;Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; for a successful replication, see Hippel and Hoeppner, 2019). This bias is in line with research showing that people who successfully convince themselves of a particular argument in their favor are better at convincing others (Smith, Trivers, and Hippel, 2017;, for which Schwardmann, Tripodi, and Weele (2019) provide additional evidence in the field setting of a debating competition.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Egocentric Norm Adoption

Neuber¹

2020

AEA Randomized Controlled Trials

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Social norms pervade human interaction, but their demands are often in conflict. To understand behavior, it is thus crucial to know how individuals resolve normative tradeoffs. This paper proposes that sincere judgments about the relative importance of conflicting norms are shaped by personal interest. We show that people tend to follow norms from which they benefit themselves, even in contexts where their own decisions only affect others. In a (virtual) laboratory experiment, each subject makes two decisions over allocations of points within a group of two other participants. The sets of possible allocations entail different normative tradeoffs, and subjects have no personal stakes in their own decisions. However, they are affected by others' decisions: each subject is part of a group, and the members of different groups simultaneously decide over others' allocations along a circle. We find that subjects' decisions are biased towards the normative principles aligned with their own interests, thereby favoring other players whenever these share those interests. Subjects' beliefs about the choices made by others suggest a largely unconscious mechanism. Moreover, survey answers indicate that the effects are driven by self-centered reasoning: subjects who report pronounced perspective-taking are less biased.

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Biased judgements of fairness in bargaining: A replication in the laboratory

Cited by 13 publications

References 27 publications

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Can you trust your lawyer's call? Legal advisers exhibit myside bias resistant to debiasing interventions

Egocentric Norm Adoption

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