Biased Policy and Political Behavior: The Case of Uneven Removal of Elected Mayors in Israel

Ben-Bassat, Avi; Dahan, Momi

doi:10.1111/polp.12280

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Moreover, from 2003, the Minister of the Interior also appointed external accountants who were authorized to impose extra taxes, levies, and fees, and to control new appointments, contracts, tenders, cash flow, and efficiency and recovery plans. In 2009, external accountants were acting in 40% of Israel’s local authorities (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2009). However, central intervention through recovery plans generally did not produce the expected results, and many failing local authorities found themselves cycling through one recovery plan after another.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How effective is central enforcement? Evidence from convened committees in failing local authorities

Reingewertz

Beeri

2017

Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space

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The recent economic slowdown has revealed weaknesses in existing fiscal arrangements and led to the reintroduction of enforcement mechanisms on local authorities within the OECD. One extreme intervention approach for municipalities in financial distress includes neutralization of the elected local leadership and its replacement with a convened committee. Yet how effective are such enforcement methods in the stabilization of local authorities? We present, for the first time, a complete empirical examination of how neutralization affects the financial performance of failing local authorities, as measured by municipal spending, revenue and fiscal balance. We apply the difference-in-differences methodology using data on 77 Israeli municipalities during 2000–2011 to answer this question. We find a sizeable effect of convened committees on the financial performance of local authorities, including an 11% reduction in municipal labor costs, a 6% reduction in current deficits and a 40% reduction in municipal debt. We also find some evidence for an increase in local tax collection. The fall in debt is partly due to an increase in targeted government transfers and may reflect increased political trust. We discuss the results in light of possible tensions between the neutralization approach and local democracy and conclude that while convened committees improve the financial performance of local authorities, they should be reserved for extreme municipal crises.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How effective is central enforcement? Evidence from convened committees in failing local authorities

Reingewertz

Beeri

2017

Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space

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“…Politicians seeking re-elections are likely to gain more political support if they pursue policies that are in favor of advantaged groups, and thus public policy is not only influenced by politics but also influences it, as Schattschneider (1935) suggested. This relation has received empirical support in several studies (Pierson 1993, Soss 1999, Mettler 2005, Bruch et al 2010, Ben-Bassat and Dahan 2018.…”

Section: Conceptual Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 87%

Social Construction and the Progressivity of Local Tax Relief

Dahan

2021

SSRN Journal

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This paper reveals a noticeable difference between a high degree of progressivity of incomerelated local property tax relief versus the proportional or regressive incidence of recognition tax relief. Recognition tax relief is tax relief given to specified social sectors which recognizes either their contributions to society or their identity-related suffering. Social groups that are characterized by political power and positive image following social construction process are expected to receive more favorable tax treatment regardless of their material needs. This study advances our understanding by showing that the degree of progressiveness of a tax system is shaped by social construction which implies a more complex trade-off between equality, efficiency and social construction in designing the tax system. JEL-Codes: H210, H220.

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“…Second, inconsistent policies may reflect a cost-benefit calculation that led elected officials to discriminate against the PAI in one sphere (e.g., land) but accommodate them in another sphere (e.g., education). Despite their high costs, the promotion of discriminatory policies has already been observed by scholars of Israeli politics (Ben-Bassat & Dahan, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucrats as policy makers: Minority accommodation and exclusion in ethnic nation‐states

Talal

2022

Politics & Policy

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Why do some ethnic nation‐states employ simultaneously inconsistent policies toward ethnic minorities, accommodating them in one sphere but excluding them from another? This article argues that this incoherent treatment of minorities results from the delegation of authority to bureaucrats. Building on the principal‐agent approach and nationalism scholarship, this work develops a causal mechanism explaining the conditions under which bureaucrats can shift state policies toward ethnic minorities and the types of policy preferences they seek to materialize. Defining policy problems, strategically framing optimal solutions, and building support for policy initiatives are the mechanisms through which nonelected officials challenge the existing status quo and seek to shift state policies toward ethnic minorities. This theoretical framework is applied to education and land policies in Israel vis‐à‐vis the Palestinian Arab citizens to illustrate how entrepreneurial bureaucrats can bring about diverse policy outcomes toward the same minority. Related Articles Ben‐Bassat, Avi, and Momi Dahan. 2018. “Biased Policy and Political Behavior: The Case of Uneven Removal of Elected Mayors in Israel.” Politics & Policy 46(6): 912–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12280. Harel‐Shalev, Ayelet. 2009. “Lingual and Educational Policy toward ‘Homeland Minorities’ in Deeply Divided Societies: India and Israel as Case Studies.” Politics & Policy 37(5): 951–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00206.x. Tusalem, Rollin F. 2015. “Ethnic Minority Governments, Democracy, and Human Rights.” Politics & Policy 43(4): 502–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12125.

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Biased Policy and Political Behavior: The Case of Uneven Removal of Elected Mayors in Israel

Cited by 7 publications

References 49 publications

How effective is central enforcement? Evidence from convened committees in failing local authorities

How effective is central enforcement? Evidence from convened committees in failing local authorities

Social Construction and the Progressivity of Local Tax Relief

Bureaucrats as policy makers: Minority accommodation and exclusion in ethnic nation‐states

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