Biased Recommendations

Chung, Wonsuk; Harbaugh, Rick

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2166379

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(75 reference statements)

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“…Outside of the standard Crawford and Sobel framework, Gneezy (2005) documents a strong behavioral aversion to sending deceptive messages in a simple sender-receiver game, making comparisons to behavior in a dictator game with similar payoffs (see also Ottaviani and Squintani (2006), Kartik (2009), Kartik, Ottaviani, andSquintani (2007), for theoretical treatments). Chung and Harbaugh (2014) experimentally examine persuasive cheap talk where senders have state-independent preferences (for theory, cf. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), finding broad support for the theoretic predictions (see also Lafky and Wilson (2015), who vary a conditional transfer in a related one-sender environment).…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

Vespa

Wilson

2016

Quantitative Economics

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We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders' private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem-that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be approximated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In particular, there are equilibria in which the receiver makes perfectly informed decisions in almost every period, even if no informative communication can be sustained in the stage game. We conclude that repeated interaction can overcome strategic limits of communication.

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Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

Vespa

Wilson

2016

Quantitative Economics

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“…The differences in the recommendations of experts appear to be important for triangulation on the state of nature by committee members. That individuals can discount biases is known (Chung and Harbaugh, 2014) but how that takes place in the context of an equilibrating process, is not known. Is the information transfer to a single committee member facilitated by the voting patterns of other committee members or by the comments of the experts during committee deliberations?…”

Section: Summary Of Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, in the committee setting a large number of states exist, the receivers (the committee members) take only one action and all messages are public and are in the form of a recommended action as opposed to an identification of the state. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) and Chung and Harbaugh (2014) explore the beliefs of a single decision maker as possibly influenced by a biased, multi-dimensional recommendation and in that context explore the role of transparency of biases following the questions posed by Dickhaut, McCabe and Mukherji (1995).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Transfer and Aggregation in an Uninformed Committee: A Model for the Selection and Use of Biased Expert Advice

Plott

Llewellyn²

2014

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions. Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the opening of a meeting. Two experts are selected who have known, opposing biases -a dyadic mechanism. The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if committee members know what the experts know. The information transfer occurs because committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts.JEL classification: C90; D71; D81

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“…[ 9 ] This regularity has been tested multiple times in laboratory experiments. [ 4 , 10 – 13 ] Second, a principal will not delegate work to an agent with preferences that are too different from his own. [ 14 ] Third, overtime, workers in hierarchical organizations such as health care facilities tend to develop pride towards their practices[ 15 ] and to resist changes promoted by outsiders.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health technology assessments conducted in health care facilities: A strategic practice? Findings from a content analysis of HTA reports

2017

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In this paper, we test the hypothesis that health technology assessment units located in hospitals tend to be more optimistic toward technologies that are currently in use in their organization than technologies that are not. The data include 108 health technologies assessed in 87 full-scale health technology assessment reports produced by the four main local health technology assessment units in Quebec (Canada) on behalf of decision makers from the same facility. We found that 58 (53.7 percent) of the 108 technologies were currently in use within the hospital during their assessment. Based on the assessors' interpretation of the scientific evidence regarding the efficacy of the technologies, 67.3 percent of the technologies that were in use in the hospital during the evaluation were effective (56 percent for those that were not currently being used), but the difference is not statistically significant (chi-square 1.38; p = 0.24). Controlling for the efficacy judgment, the type of technologies (i.e. preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic or organizational), the number of technologies assessed in the report and the assessment unit, we found that the technologies that were currently in use in the facility during the evaluation were 62 percent more likely to be recommended favorably by the assessment unit than the technologies that were not currently being used (RR = 1.62; 95 percent CI = 1.06–1.88). This suggests that the local health technology units that were examined in the study tended to be more optimistic toward technologies that were currently in use in their hospital at the time of the evaluation.

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Biased Recommendations

Cited by 5 publications

References 52 publications

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

Communication with multiple senders: An experiment

Information Transfer and Aggregation in an Uninformed Committee: A Model for the Selection and Use of Biased Expert Advice

Health technology assessments conducted in health care facilities: A strategic practice? Findings from a content analysis of HTA reports

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