More often than not, attempts to settle the semantics of information produce confusion instead of the desired clarity. The passage just quoted, for example, immediately invites speculation on the enduring dialectic between "information as process'' and "information as thing" (Buckland, 1991). Historical and etymological analysis of the word information can throw light on this tension, as well as provide, of course, a first example in this chapter of information history in action. The classical meaning of information revolved around information as an activity or happening (information as verb), our actions being "informed by the metaphysical or, from the Enlightenment onwards, by the hidden powers of reason (Peters, 1988). Bailey's A New Universal Etymological English Dictionary, published in 1775, defines information as "the act of informing or actuating." Derived from the Latin word informare (to instruct), it has a long history of being used in the sense of the receiving or giving of new knowledge about something. However, in recent centuries, and emphatically in recent decades, what has come to the fore is the notion of information as an item (information as noun)-a change of meaning wholly in keeping, of course, with the increased commercialization and commodification of information. The reification of information, the conversion of it from a processual concept into a "thing," implies that almost any aspect of human culture, material or otherwise, can be considered to have an information dynamic. Even in discourses where the "process7' definition of information receives support, there can be a tendency to emphasize-unhelpfully for our purposes, it might be suggested-the perceived universality of information, as in the case of the following statement:The concept of information science is based on the assumption that all organisms are information systems . . . . The information system is an environment of persons, machines, and procedures that augment [sic] human biological potential to acquire, process, and act upon data. (Debons, Horne, & Croneweth, 1988, pp. 8-9) All this leaves those attempting to theorize and formulate a discrete subject named "information history" with a difficult problem. If information itself defies precise definition, what chance is there that its definition might be historicized? There is a danger that information history, like information, can be conceptualized in such vague and heterogeneous ways that it is rendered unwieldy and thus unsuitable for the award of disciplinary status. A subject field that potentially accommo-