Bicameralism, intra-party bargaining, and the formation of party policy positions

Abstract

How do political parties arrive at their policy positions? We conceptualize position formation in federalist countries as an intra-party bargaining process in which subnational parties compete with each other in an attempt to get their own positions into their national party manifesto. Drawing on theories about inter-party bargaining over ministerial portfolios, we hypothesize that the bargaining success of subnational parties depends on their parliamentary strength. We evaluate our hypotheses based on a comprehensive dataset on policy positions of national and subnational parties in Germany from 1990 until 2009. Our results show that German subnational parties that are powerful in the second parliamentary chamber (Bundesrat) are particularly successful in shaping the manifesto of their national party. The findings have important implications for our understanding of intra-party politics and position formation within political parties in Germany more specifically and federalist countries more generally.

Citizens’ Trade-offs in State Merger Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Survey Experiment

“…We then calculate the difference of seat shares of the hypothetical post-merger state to the current political representation for respondent i's preferred party p in his or her home state s as follows: level voting appear to affect one another (Frei et al, forthcoming). While political parties in German states have own party and campaign programs, they are also important for shaping national party manifestos (Bäck et al, 2016).…”

Verba volant, scripta manent? Intra-party politics, party conferences, and issue salience in France

“…In particular, while the French PS (and French political parties more generally) are usually factionalized, further inferences require analysis of parties that are less historically divided, as the absence of stable and organized intra-party groups likely affect the agenda-setting process. Along these lines, the analysis on the impact of decentralization of internal decision-making powers as well as the role of regional party branches (considered as intra-party subgroups) in influencing the final manifesto will offer clear insights (see Bäck et al, 2014). Future comparisons will give a more conclusive answer to whether speeches and motions express the same content and whether either speeches or motions exert an agenda-setting effect on forthcoming electoral manifestos.…”

Coordination of legislative speech in times of crisis: Youth unemployment and debates on redistributive policies in the Swedish Riksdag, 1994–2014

“…A decentralised party structure and substantial autonomy for sub‐national party units, by themselves, might not produce ideological diversity, but they constitute favourable conditions for their manifestation in parliamentary behaviour. State and party federalism might even create incentives for sub‐national parties to develop different ideological profiles or to position themselves as a kind of intra‐party opposition, as studies of Germany and the Netherlands have shown (e.g., Bäck, Debus, & Klüver, ; Klingelhöfer & Müller, ; Müller, ). Relating to measures that reform and reduce welfare provisions, previous research has also investigated the intra‐party consequences of such policies.…”