2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.007
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Bidding in a possibly common-value auction

Abstract: JEL classification: D44 D82Keywords: Second-price auction Common value Model uncertaintyWe analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence.

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