The advent of contemporary evolutionary theory ushered in the eventual decline of Aristotelian Essentialism (AE) -for it is widely assumed that essence does not, and cannot have any proper place in the age of evolution. This paper argues that this assumption is a mistake: if AE can be suitably evolved, it need not face extinction. In it, I claim that if that theory"s fundamental ontology consists of dispositional properties, and if its characteristic metaphysical machinery is interpreted within the framework of contemporary evolutionary developmental biology, an evolved essentialism is available. The reformulated theory of AE offered in this paper not only fails to fall prey to the typical collection of criticisms, but is also independently both theoretically and empirically plausible. The paper contends that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.Within contemporary philosophy of biology, there is perhaps no greater maligned theory than Aristotelian Essentialism (AE). Now that the rosy dawn of Aristotelian metaphysics has faded into twilight 1 , citing the essence of an organism as an explanatory principle is indicative either of a rather hopeless scientific naiveté or else a dogmatic entrenchment in scholasticism. It is generally agreed that the sun set upon AE for a simple, yet powerful reason: the advent of evolutionary theory. According to the implications of that theory, kind-essences are an ontological superfluity which the world not only has no need of, but simply cannot countenance. However, evolutionary theory has recently had its own paradigm shift, ushered in with the rise of the union between it and developmental theory. With its increasing emphasis on modular, structural explanations of morphological novelty and variation, evolutionary developmental biology (evodevo) has arguably prompted a substantial reshaping of our understanding of the very nature of biological individuals. In light of this reformation, the question naturally arises: what is it to be the what-it-is-to-be of an organism? In what follows, I suggest that the answer to that question is one best interpreted within the ontological framework of AE. I contend that, properly understood, essence belongs in the age of evolution.
Aristotelian Essentialism vs. Evolution First things first: what exactly is AE?One can find many distinct (though often overlapping) definitions in the literature, but here, for the sake of simplicity, and without wishing to rehearse decades of debate, I focus on a simple three-point definition. An Aristotelian essence is (a) comprised of a natural set of intrinsic properties which (b) constitute generative mechanisms for particularised morphological development which (c) are shared among groups of organisms, delineating them as members of the same "kind". Regarding (a), the set of properties that comprise an essence and define a natural kind cannot be extrinsic, or relational properties -abstract properties of phylogenetic lineage or interbreeding relations, etc. -and their being a ...