Biodiversity skepticism and measurement practices

Abstract

This paper challenges “biodiversity skepticism:” an inferential move that acknowledges the proliferation, heterogeneity, and lack of covariance of biodiversity measurements, and concludes that we should doubt the scientific validity of the biodiversity concept. As a way out of skepticism, philosophers have advocated for eliminating “biodiversity” from scientific inquiry, revising it, or deflating its meaning into a single measurable dimension. I present a counterargument to the inferential move of the skeptic by revealing how it stands on two unstated premises, namely a reflective view of measurements and the unidirectional dynamics between definitional and measurement practices, and corollary assumptions. These premises and assumptions are misaligned with a richer theoretical understanding of measurement and are sometimes inconsistent with how science operates. A more nuanced view of measurement could better explain measurement proliferation while being consistent with new ways in which the general biodiversity concept could be useful. To conclude, I urge philosophers of measurement and conceptual engineers to collaborate in tackling the interplay between conceptual change and measurement practices.