1991
DOI: 10.1128/cmr.4.2.207-241.1991
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Biological safety cabinetry.

Abstract: tively, not divine origin, induced disease. In 1546, Fracastorius described the agent of communicable disease as a living contagium vivum that spread by direct contact, by intermediary fomites, or through the air and postulated that these living seeds, passed from one infected animal, produced the same disease in an animal that received them. In 1676, Leeuwenhoek discovered and described bacteria, but bacteriology as a science dates from the middle of the 19th century, a result of the scientific studies of Lou… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…21 Experience shows that the recognition and isolation of a new infectious agent is often followed by a reported laboratory-acquired infection caused by the new isolate, as was reported for SARS. 22,23 The infection of a single laboratory worker with a highly infectious agent could be the origin of an outbreak, particularly if the agent has the capability of human-to-human transmission (ie, SARS-associated coronavirus). 23 In some situations, such as a cough in so-called "superspreader" patients with extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis, smallpox, or SARS-associated coronavirus, or exposure to infected blood of a patient with late-phase haemorrhagic fever, the inoculums to which health-care workers are exposed are likely to be equivalent to those received by a laboratory worker during specimen handling.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…21 Experience shows that the recognition and isolation of a new infectious agent is often followed by a reported laboratory-acquired infection caused by the new isolate, as was reported for SARS. 22,23 The infection of a single laboratory worker with a highly infectious agent could be the origin of an outbreak, particularly if the agent has the capability of human-to-human transmission (ie, SARS-associated coronavirus). 23 In some situations, such as a cough in so-called "superspreader" patients with extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis, smallpox, or SARS-associated coronavirus, or exposure to infected blood of a patient with late-phase haemorrhagic fever, the inoculums to which health-care workers are exposed are likely to be equivalent to those received by a laboratory worker during specimen handling.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The chamber was designed mainly to separate the internal controlled environment from the external environment, and the operator from the experiment and the experimental products. The primary aim was to prevent crosscontamination from the internal to the external environment or vice versa (Kruse et al, 1991;Wathes and Johnson, 1991;Huang, 2005;Tattershall, 2006). Isolation chambers were designed to improve experimental safety by preventing this cross-contamination, reducing the likelihood of operator error, and minimizing the contaminated area.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Safe handling and processing of specimens can be conducted in biological safety cabinets (BSC) to prevent inhalation of generated aerosols when performing a microbiological procedure (Kruse et al, 1991). The purpose of using BSC must be well differentiated from using fume hoods, in which the latter is only necessary for handling chemicals and not for infectious microorganisms.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%