Bloom filters (BFs) and homomorphic encryption (HE) are prominent techniques used to design biometric template protection (BTP) schemes that aim to protect sensitive biometric information during storage and biometric comparison. However, the pros and cons of BF-and HE-based BTPs are not well studied in literature. We investigate the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches since both seem promising from a theoretical viewpoint. Our key insight is to extend our theoretical investigation to cover the practical case of iris recognition on the ground that iris (1) benefits from the alignment-free property of BFs and (2) induces huge computational burdens when implemented in the HE-encrypted domain. BF-based BTPs can be implemented to be either fast with high recognition accuracy while missing the important privacy property of 'unlinkability', or to be fast with unlinkability-property while missing the high accuracy. HE-based BTPs, on the other hand, are highly secure, achieve good accuracy, and meet the unlinkability-property, but they are much slower than BF-based approaches. As a synthesis, we propose a hybrid BTP scheme that combines the good properties of BFs and HE, ensuring unlinkability and high recognition accuracy, while being about seven times faster than the traditional HE-based approach.
| INTRODUCTIONA biometric template is a compact representation of a physiological or a behavioural biometric characteristic such as face, iris, voice, etc. The biometric characteristic itself is not a secret as, in human-to-human interaction, humans recognise each other from their actual characteristics. However, in a human-tomachine interaction, a biometric template becomes a numerical equivalent of the human characteristic understandable by a machine. Thus, a biometric template reflects the identity of an individual that allows him/her to be recognized by the system. Given the fact that systems are subject to various types of security threats, a biometric template must be well protected.References [2, 3] define biometric template protection (BTP) schemes as the branch of biometrics that tackles the problem of persevering biometric templates while maintaining the recognition performance. There exist different approaches to design BTP schemes that try to satisfy the privacy requirements of the international standard ISO/IEC 24,745 [4]: irreversibility, unlinkability, and confidentiality. Among those approaches, Bloom filter (BF)-based BTPs, process the template in a transformed domain, while homomorphic encryption (HE)-based BTPs, process the template in an encrypted domain. Both approaches have common and exclusive interesting properties that deal with the BTP challenges and the tradeoffs. Several surveys investigate either Bloom filters [5,6] This paper is an extension of [1] published at BIOSIG 2021.