Biosecurity as a boundary object: Science, society, and the state

Abstract

Biosecurity is a concern in many parts of the world but is differently conceived and addressed depending on context. This article draws on two cases concerned with life sciences research involving dangerous pathogens, one in the United States and one in Israel, to examine this variability. In both cases, concern revolves around issues of biosafety and bioterrorism, which are targeted by similar policies and solutions. The cases, nevertheless, differ. In the United States, biosecurity is contextualized in the dynamics between science and society, and apprehension about research with dangerous pathogens focuses on the social risks and benefits of such research. In Israel, biosecurity is contextualized in the dynamics between science and the state and hinges on whether and how far the state should restrict scientific freedom. In view of this difference, the authors advocate the development of a nuanced concept of biosecurity capable of describing and explaining local permutations. They suggest reconceptualizing biosecurity as a boundary object that mediates between competing domains and that takes variable form in efforts to resolve the problem of securing life.

Boundary Concepts for Boundary Work Between Science and Technology Studies and International Relations: Special Issue Introduction

“…This special issue builds on the cross‐fertilization that results from (i) the growing conceptualization efforts made by science and technology studies (STS) from the 1980s to 2000s to better understand the science/policy interface and (ii) subsequent applications in international relations (IR), where several international institutions meant to be science/policy interfaces have been established. So far, STS boundary conceptualizations and international studies have been only cautiously studied together, with a few exceptions in security studies (for instance, Samimian‐Darash, Henner‐Shapira, & Daviko, ). There are, however, good reasons to believe in fertile hybridization outcomes for both academic disciplines, especially with regard to the analysis of international institutions .…”

Bioinformational diplomacy: Global health emergencies, data sharing and sequential life

“…The rise of pathogen sequence data is also introducing new stratifications into the field of international security: there are countries in the world capable now of using sequence data to better secure their populations against health-based threats, while many other countries occupy a much more subaltern position of mostly being asked to freely share their sequence data with the rest of the world (Go, 2016;see Harding, 2011;Helmy et al, 2016;Reardon, 2017). More broadly, all these emergent molecular practices around sequential life are also buttressing the wider field of global health security (Kamradt-Scott, 2015;Rushton, 2019;Rushton and Youde, 2014;Samimian-Darash et al, 2016) by raising awareness about the continual presence of biological danger, and by facilitating enhanced molecular strategies for developing new medical countermeasures. The pathogen genetic sequence data being generated inside of scientific laboratories are thus becoming deeply entangled with the wider field of (bio)security (see Hoijtink and Leese, 2019;Vogel et al, 2017).…”

Entangled security: Science, co-production, and intra-active insecurity

“…The H5N1 experiments, by contrast, were performed in university laboratories with every intention of openly publishing the results -rapidly projecting biosafety consideration to the forefront of the health security agenda (Connel and Rappert 2016: 258). Science itself was now becoming much more widely perceived as a potential source of danger, and scientists would therefore have to expect much more scrutiny of these kinds of experiments moving forward (Samimian-Darash et al 2016).…”