Bismarck and the German Empire 1871-1918

Abrams, Lynn

doi:10.4324/9780203130957

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…177 The 1815 Deutscher Bund echoed key elements of the Hanseatic structure: it had no head of state or parliament, only a Diet which wielded no power over the sovereign rulers of each state. 178 Over the mid-nineteenth century, partisan efforts to unite German-speaking states, provinces and cities in a stronger body politic gained political momentum, escalating into the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Between 1867 and 1871, Prussia under Kaiser Wilhelm I spearheaded a smaller union of northern German provinces than had been attempted in the 1815 Deutscher Bund, excluding the Austro-Hungarian empire altogether.…”

Section: Hamburg Trading Firms and The Legacy Of The Hansamentioning

confidence: 99%

International Status in the Shadow of Empire

Storr

2020

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Section: Hamburg Trading Firms and The Legacy Of The Hansamentioning

confidence: 99%

International Status in the Shadow of Empire

Storr

2020

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“…The new constitution entrenched the federal structure of the empire. States retained power over their internal affairs, while the federal government controlled internationally oriented issues and standardization (Abrams 2006: 12–13). The federal government was granted exclusive control over key “matters of importance to Germany’s economic well-being,” but this left a considerable sphere of power to the states, with jurisdiction over “all matters that affected the citizen’s daily life and the safety and well-being of his family” (Craig 1999: 40).…”

Section: The Asymmetric Federalism Of the Fragile German Empirementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The states were also able to maintain their interests at the national level through their appointed representatives in the Bundesrat, which acted as the second chamber alongside the Reichstag and its elected members. The Bundesrat had an absolute veto in matters directly concerning their jurisdiction or administrative resources, and had a suspensive veto in all other areas, with each state granted votes in proportion to its size (Abrams 2006: 14). This arrangement is particularly central given that the proportional system of voting in the Bundesrat gave Prussia a veto on constitutional amendments (Craig 1999: 42).…”

Section: The Asymmetric Federalism Of the Fragile German Empirementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The introduction of the insurance package is sometimes seen as an attempt by Bismarck to “shore up the fragility of the new German state” and bribe the working class to secure their support for and subservience to the empire (Abrams 2006: 40–41, 46). But this motive, in and of itself, does not fully explain why the programs were introduced, and helps even less to understand the broad political support for reform or the eventual idiosyncratic policy outcome (i.e., the hybrid character of the first German insurance bodies as state-funded yet independent agencies).…”

Section: Problem Pressure and The Politics Of Social Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Problem Pressure and Social Policy Innovation: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Germany

Horn¹,

Kevins²

2018

Soc. sci. hist.

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In studying how to best understand social program introduction, political scientists have built up a laundry list of contributory factors. We suggest, however, that “objective” problem pressure has been incorrectly neglected by many scholars in recent decades—and the well-known case of Germany’s nineteenth-century introduction of social insurance legislation provides a clear illustration of this point. In explaining the origins and design of German social insurance, the interplay of three factors is key: first, exceptionally high problem pressure, connected to both labor market- and state-building processes; second, a fragile institutional context dominated by Prussia; and third, the party political constellation. In making this argument, we draw on “open functional reasoning” and extract implications from the case study to further refine the underlying theory. Specifically, we find that goal-oriented action may both be more common and more prone to compromise than the theory suggests. As such, we not only present an argument for considering the potential impact of problem pressure, but also lay out and refine an approach to doing so. In contrasting this approach to the problematic functionalism that initially inclined many scholars to neglect of problem pressure, we hope to help rehabilitate the concept—and in the process strengthen the explanatory power of research in sociology and political science.

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“…6 Even after the introduction of elections in 1871 in the German Empire, there was no secret ballot, and in Prussia inegalitarian suffrage laws vastly over-represented votes by the wealthy in the so-called 'three-class voting system'. Furthermore, the Reichstag was counterbalanced by a very strong executive, first headed by the 'Iron Chancellor' Otto von Bismarck from 1871 to 1890 (Abrams 2006).…”

Section: Specifying the Treatment Effect Of 'Danish Versus German Rule'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust in Scandinavia: Findings from Moving Borders between Denmark and Germany

Andersen

2017

Scand Pol Stud

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Scandinavian societies express the world's highest levels of trust in surveys and display high levels of social capital more generally. Scholars and policy makers disagree on whether this reflects high economic equality brought about by inclusive, universalist welfare states after the Second World War or historical legacies of political stability and relative social harmony. This article utilizes a geographic regression discontinuity (GRD) natural experiment from history of moving borders between Denmark and Germany to examine the effect of belonging to a Scandinavian state on trust and cooperative behavior. Results from historical Danish rule prior to 1864 in North Germany and German rule in South Denmark from 1864 to 1920 suggest that institutional differences influenced early mass political behavior, but not social behavior. However, such early regime impacts petered out quickly. Today, there is little to no discernable difference in trust attributable to Danish state heritage in North Germany or South Denmark. This suggests that sizable differences in social trust between Germany and Denmark are instead attributable to post‐1920 factors.

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Bismarck and the German Empire 1871-1918

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

International Status in the Shadow of Empire

International Status in the Shadow of Empire

Problem Pressure and Social Policy Innovation: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Germany

Trust in Scandinavia: Findings from Moving Borders between Denmark and Germany

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