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Kamiński, Marek M.; Lissowski, Grzegorz; Świstak, Piotr

doi:10.1023/a:1005042010270

Cited by 36 publications

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“…Light auto-lustration was a sensible strategy as insurance against the harsher punishment by the new government. In fact, in both Hungary and Poland, A won the next election but M became the new median, and despite many attempts, A was unable to strengthen the existing lustration law significantly [38].…”

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Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

Kamiński

2019

Games

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I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework. Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets. A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution (BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games.

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Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

Kamiński

2019

Games

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A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition

Kamiński

2006

Soc Choice Welfare

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Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015

Kamiński

2018

Public Choice

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I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of spoilers. In single-office elections, a "classic" spoiler turns a winner into a nonwinner and a non-winner into a winner. Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office elections. In such elections, spoilers include a "Kingmaker", who turns a non-winner into a winner; a "Kingslayer", who turns a winner into a non-winner; a "Valuegobbler", who subtracts from some competitor more seats than it receives; and "Selfspoilers", who may be hurt by competing separately rather than creating an electoral coalition. Various strategic spoilers, such as fake parties, are possible as well. I look for spoilers in eight Polish parliamentary elections that have taken place since the fall of communism in 1989. In two elections, the consequences of spoilers were massive. In 1993, multiple spoilers on the right helped the two postcommunist parties return to power, slow down decommunization and create strong institutional obstacles to further democratization. In 2015, a spoiler manufactured a majority for the largest party (PiS) and, as a consequence, enabled PiS quickly to implement radical reforms. In other elections, spoilers had smaller, but noticeable consequences. The results suggest that parliamentary elections using PR party-list systems are vulnerable to spoiler problems that may cause significant political effects.

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Cited by 36 publications

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Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

Generalized Backward Induction: Justification for a Folk Algorithm

A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition

Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015

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