Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy auctions

Meeus, Leonardo; Verhaegen, Karolien; Belmans, Ronnie

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.04.031

Cited by 86 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 9 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…One of the recent trends in the development of auctions is combinatorial auctions [1,5,13,26,28,30,34,40]. Combinatorial auctions allow the simultaneous sale of more than one item.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An efficient method to find approximate solutions for combinatorial double auctions

Hsieh

Liao

2013

2013 10th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although combinatorial auctions can be applied to improve the efficiency of trading goods, it is notoriously difficult to solve combinatorial auction problems from a computation point of view. In this paper, we formulate the combinatorial double auction problem and propose an algorithm for finding approximate solutions. The algorithm is developed by decomposing the combinatorial double auction problem into several buyers' subproblems and sellers' subproblems, applying the subgradient algorithm to iteratively adjust the shadow prices and proposing a heuristic algorithm for finding approximate solutions. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithm is also illustrated by comparison with an existing solver.

show abstract

“…One of the recent trends in the development of auctions is combinatorial auctions [1,5,13,26,28,30,34,40]. Combinatorial auctions allow the simultaneous sale of more than one item.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An efficient method to find approximate solutions for combinatorial double auctions

Hsieh

Liao

2013

2013 10th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…On average there are 10.76 rejected combinatorial bids, so called paradoxically rejected bids (PRB) (cf. [14]) that could potentially have generated a net profit. However, in most cases these bids cannot be included without decreasing the overall economic surplus or rejecting other bids that are in the money.…”

Section: Emcc Optimizermentioning

confidence: 99%

Strict linear prices in non-convex European day-ahead electricity markets

Martín

Müller

Pokutta

2013

Optimization Methods and Software

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with associated quantities given the prices. The goal of our auction is to maximize the economic surplus of all participants subject to quantity constraints and price constraints. The price constraints ensure that no one incurs a loss. Only traders who submitted a combinatorial bid might miss a not-realized profit. The resulting problem is a large scale mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and binary variables that cannot be solved efficiently by standard solvers. We present an exact algorithm and a fast heuristic for this type of problem. Both algorithms decompose the MPEC into a master problem (a MIQP) and pricing subproblems (LPs). The modeling technique and the algorithms are applicable to a wide variety of combinatorial auctions that are based on mixed integer programs.

show abstract

“…The acceptance of a block order depends on its bid price and the volume-weighted average DA price in the hours contained in the block. A linked block order is a block order that is part of a set of multiple block orders that have a linked clearing constraint, while an exclusive block order is part of a set of block orders of which, at most, one can be cleared [1,56]. Complex orders allow the implicit inclusion of cost non-convexities and intertemporal links.…”

Section: Day-ahead Market Order Typesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interactions between the design of short-term electricity markets in the CWE region and power system flexibility

et al. 2017

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Short-term electricity markets are generally defined as markets that take place from the day-ahead stage until physical generation and consumption. These markets include dayahead, intra-day, and real-time balancing markets. In Europe, the first two are managed by power exchanges, while the third consists of reserve procurement and imbalance settlement and is operated by the local transmission system operator. Short-term markets are important tools to deal with net demand variability in the system, in which the need for flexibility is expressed and its provision is valorized. Due to the ongoing integration of variable renewables in the generation mix, the system's variability is increasing as a result of the limited controllability and predictability of those resources. As such, these markets become increasingly important. The contribution of this article is a comprehensive upto-date discussion of the key design parameters and functioning of all three short-term markets, and their impact on the demand for and supply of flexibility. An understanding of the design and its implications is useful to policy-makers who are considering changes to facilitate the integration, availability, or valorization of flexibility, while also contributing to the decision-making of flexibility investors and operators. The geographical scope is the Central Western European region, including the Belgian, French, German, and Dutch market zones.

show abstract

Block order restrictions in combinatorial electric energy auctions

Cited by 86 publications

References 9 publications

An efficient method to find approximate solutions for combinatorial double auctions

An efficient method to find approximate solutions for combinatorial double auctions

Strict linear prices in non-convex European day-ahead electricity markets

Interactions between the design of short-term electricity markets in the CWE region and power system flexibility

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About