2018
DOI: 10.1080/13216597.2018.1544162
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Blood and ink: the relationship between Islamic State propaganda and Western media

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Cited by 9 publications
(10 citation statements)
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References 21 publications
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“…As we have seen, though audiences are presented with a range of competing frames in the aftermath of these incidents, the dominance of the "(Para)Military" frame across the coverage, not to mention its mobilisation by journalists, politicians and government sources, alongside representatives of the police, security and legal domains, stands to reinforce longstanding academic debates claiming that news coverage of terrorism tends to be kept within tight, "elite-legitimated" boundaries (after Hallin 1986). In this respect, the findings add to previous analysis of television news coverage of al-Qaeda (Ahmad 2016), and recent studies focusing on print reportage of the Islamic State threat (see Smith et al 2016;Boyle & Mower 2019;Courty et al 2019), shedding much-needed light on both the visual and verbal dimensions of these portrayals, revealing how certain frames are selected over and above others, and how the various frames interact to make foreign policies appear more conceivable. The analysis also strengthens research by Gadarian (2010Gadarian ( & 2014, which focuses more on public perceptions of threats rather than their cultural imaginations.…”
Section: [Insert Chart 2 Here]supporting
confidence: 77%
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“…As we have seen, though audiences are presented with a range of competing frames in the aftermath of these incidents, the dominance of the "(Para)Military" frame across the coverage, not to mention its mobilisation by journalists, politicians and government sources, alongside representatives of the police, security and legal domains, stands to reinforce longstanding academic debates claiming that news coverage of terrorism tends to be kept within tight, "elite-legitimated" boundaries (after Hallin 1986). In this respect, the findings add to previous analysis of television news coverage of al-Qaeda (Ahmad 2016), and recent studies focusing on print reportage of the Islamic State threat (see Smith et al 2016;Boyle & Mower 2019;Courty et al 2019), shedding much-needed light on both the visual and verbal dimensions of these portrayals, revealing how certain frames are selected over and above others, and how the various frames interact to make foreign policies appear more conceivable. The analysis also strengthens research by Gadarian (2010Gadarian ( & 2014, which focuses more on public perceptions of threats rather than their cultural imaginations.…”
Section: [Insert Chart 2 Here]supporting
confidence: 77%
“…The "(Para)Military" frame Comprising 49.7% of the total number of framing and reasoning devices, the most common way of viewing the Islamic State in the coverage is described here as the "(Para)Military" frame (see Hülsse & Spencer 2008;Smith et al 2016;Courty et al 2019). Within this frame, the Islamic State is portrayed as an external, paramilitary-style organisation that, while motivated by religious factors, justifies its actions principally by way of secular concerns such as the impact of French air-strikes on its territory.…”
Section: [Insert Chart 1 Here -See Appendix]mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Case in 2013: Incident Carnival riots. Before the bloody incident on Wednesday, September 11, 2013, there was a BAKESBANGPOL meeting on Monday, September 9, 2013, Hours: 19.00 WIB to prevent clashes from occurring fear of triggering clashes like what happened in 2012 (Courty et al, 2019). The meeting was held by Muspida, PCNU Jember, PCNU Kencong, MUI Jember, Muspika Puger at the Aston hotel.…”
Section: Santet As Rivalry To Kyaimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…(2) religious extremism associated with the global spread of Salafism, particularly Saudi Arabian Wahhabism, since the 1970s, which has promoted a shariah-oriented, literalist, ultra-conservative, intolerant interpretation of Islam; and (3) radicalization arising from grievances over 21st-century Western military interventions in Muslim-majority countries associated with the war on terror, coupled with feelings of marginalization and discrimination in response to pejorative Western media and political discourses concerning Islam and Muslims. The massive death tolls and destruction caused by Western military interventions have created conditions that have produced militant groups such as ISIS and reinforced their recruitment propaganda (Mahood and Rane 2017), while Western media coverage and political discourses that conflate Muslims with terrorism, and Islam with politicized violence (Courty et al 2018), have contributed to the alienation and radicalization of some Muslims, particularly among those whose formative years occurred in the post-9/11 era (Roose 2016; Rane and Bull 2019), including Muslim Australian terrorism offenders.…”
Section: Time-period Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%