2015
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-015-9328-y
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Board attributes and shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions: a survey of the literature

Abstract: International audienceThe question of whether a “good” corporate board structure can optimize performance and minimize conflicts between managers and shareholders has been widely debated. Because mergers and acquisitions represent major managerial investment decisions that are subject to board scrutiny, the effectiveness of a board’s structure is especially visible in the context of corporate acquisitions. With that in mind, in this paper, we examine the abundant literature in the fields of strategic managemen… Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…In conclusion, we emphasize the analysis performed by Redor (2015). By considering "four board attributes: (1) board independence, (2) board size and director-specific attributes,…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 88%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In conclusion, we emphasize the analysis performed by Redor (2015). By considering "four board attributes: (1) board independence, (2) board size and director-specific attributes,…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 88%
“…(3) board ownership and compensation, and (4) multiple directorships" (Redor, 2015:1), the author concludes that "the impact of board attributes on shareholder wealth in mergers and acquisitions is specific to each firm" (Redor, 2015:1).…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also, the impact of governance mechanisms on corporate takeovers [22], the position of the firms within the network and network centrality in China [27], toehold bidding and premiums in the US [19], abnormal announcement returns in the US [40], and acquiring-firm shareholder loses around acquisition announcements in the US [40] have been investigated. Within this corporate governance literature, there is a stream of research oriented towards the study of how the characteristics of the board [45], such as board independence [41,46,47], board size [48], board meetings, or board ownership, affect the propensity to acquire other firms [49]. In this research, we focused on the importance of interlocks and former politicians on firm acquisitions.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite this uncertainty and a substantial decrease in takeover activity during the financial crisis, acquisitions have reached new heights all over the world [22]. This fact has caused a shift of focus in the literature [45], now oriented towards the study of how the characteristics of the board, such as board independence [41,46,47], board size [48], board meetings, or board ownership, affect the propensity to acquire other firms [49]. In contrast, we focused on the importance of interlocks and former politicians on firms' acquisitions.…”
Section: Theoretical Background and Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are many studies that investigated shareholder's wealth in different area, i.e. Sukuk and conventional bonds (Sherif & Erkol, 2017), board attributes (Redor, 2016), dividend (Nguyen, 2014), CEO turnover (Ting, 2013), and corporate real estate (Liow & Ooi, 2006). However, there is a lack of studies that investigate the effect of Board of Commissioners involvement on shareholder's wealth.…”
Section: A Shareholders Wealthmentioning
confidence: 99%