2005
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.11.002
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Board composition and firm value under concentrated ownership: the Canadian evidence

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Cited by 103 publications
(78 citation statements)
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“…Further, their results also find a negative relationship between the higher proportion of independent directors on board and related party transactions. Erickson et al (2005) in dominant shareholder regime for Canadian companies find a negative relationship between the fraction of outside directors and firm value. However, the authors suggest that independent board was able to mitigate agency problem arising out of dual class common stock.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 95%
“…Further, their results also find a negative relationship between the higher proportion of independent directors on board and related party transactions. Erickson et al (2005) in dominant shareholder regime for Canadian companies find a negative relationship between the fraction of outside directors and firm value. However, the authors suggest that independent board was able to mitigate agency problem arising out of dual class common stock.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 95%
“…Other studies like Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004), Matar et al (2014) show the same positive association between firm value and audit committee. To reduce the agency problems it is very important to place a well functioning and an independent audit committee (Erickson et al, 2005). The size and the number of meeting of audit committee is of great interest in academic discussion, and have been frequently associated with firm value (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007).…”
Section: Audit Committeementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) find firms that commit fraud are likely to have less independent ACs. Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Erickson et al, (2005) provide a positive relationship between the proportion of independent AC members serving in the board and the comprehensive of financial disclosure. Klein (1998) and Hsu (2008) find no significant association.…”
Section: International Journal Of Accounting and Financial Reportingmentioning
confidence: 99%