We examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms: (1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.
Agency problems of excess endowment holdings in not-for-profit firms AbstractWe examine three alternative explanations for excess endowments in not-for-profit firms:(1) growth opportunities, (2) monitoring, or (3) agency problems. Inconsistent with growth opportunities, we find that most excess endowments are persistent over time, and that firms with persistent excess endowments do not exhibit higher growth in program expenses or investments. Inconsistent with better monitoring, program expenditures toward the charitable good are lower for firms with excess endowments, and CEO pay and total officer and director pay are greater for firms with excess endowments. Overall, we find that excess endowments are associated with greater agency problems.
JEL classification: G31; G35; G38; J33; L31Keywords: Corporate governance; Not-for-profit; Cash holdings; Endowment; Agency problems 1
IntroductionNot-for-profit firms often maintain large endowments, and the determinants and consequences of this unusual feature have received little study. An endowment is a fund of cash and/or securities that the not-for-profit can use to finance current and future expenses. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether there are agency problems when not-for-profit firms (NFPs) hold excess endowment assets.1We use as a basis of our study the literature that explores agency problems related to cash holdings in for-profit firms (e.g., Jensen, 1986 (2002) argues that donors serve an important monitoring role in NFPs and minimize agency costs. In addition, some of the more frequently cited cash-related agency problems in forprofit firms, such as excessive risk-reducing acquisitions, are likely to be less prevalent in 1 From this point forward, we use the acronym NFP in place of "not-for-profit." In this paper, we use the terms "not-for-profit" and "nonprofit" as synonyms.2 not-for-profit firms. NFP managers may have weaker incentives to engage in riskreducing activities because less of their wealth is concentrated in firm-specific assets (i.e., the future compensation of both nonprofit and for-profit managers has a firm-specific element, but for-profit managers also have a large proportion of their wealth invested in firm-specific stock and options).On the other hand, cash-related agency problems are potentially exacerbated in We examine endowments in a broad sample o...