1993
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4101(93)90009-5
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Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers

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Cited by 783 publications
(459 citation statements)
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References 25 publications
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“…Similarly, other studies suggest that interlocked directors may increase the board social and relational capital (Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978), thus reinforcing the board strategic and networking role (Pfeffer, 1991;Carpenter & Westphal, 2001;Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001). Despite the beneficial role of interlocking directorate, empirical studies on this topic also report opposite results, suggesting that it may decrease board independence (Shivdasani, 1993;Cotter et al, 1997) and result in a weaker corporate performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Scholars suggest that also the presence of directors appointed by minority shareholders matters for the alignment aim of executive remuneration.…”
Section: Compensation Committee Quality and Executive Remunerationmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…Similarly, other studies suggest that interlocked directors may increase the board social and relational capital (Pfeffer & Salancick, 1978), thus reinforcing the board strategic and networking role (Pfeffer, 1991;Carpenter & Westphal, 2001;Hillman, Keim, & Luce, 2001). Despite the beneficial role of interlocking directorate, empirical studies on this topic also report opposite results, suggesting that it may decrease board independence (Shivdasani, 1993;Cotter et al, 1997) and result in a weaker corporate performance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). Scholars suggest that also the presence of directors appointed by minority shareholders matters for the alignment aim of executive remuneration.…”
Section: Compensation Committee Quality and Executive Remunerationmentioning
confidence: 76%
“…Finally, some papers do not specifically study performance of targets, but use other measures that are related to the inefficient management hypothesis, mostly related to corporate governance, for example board composition and ownership structure (Ambrose and Megginson 1992;Mitchell and Lehn 1990;Morck et al 1998;North 2001;Shivdasani 1993;Song and Walkling 1993;Weir and Laing 2003). Although some of the studies indeed support the inefficient management hypothesis, Agrawal and Jaffe (2003) note that corporate governance variables might as well constitute direct evidence due to the correlation with firm performance.…”
Section: Pre-acquisition Performance Of Targetsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Consistente com essa ideia, Martin e McConnell (1991) encontraram evidências de um aumento da rotatividade dos gestores depois de takeovers bem-sucedidos e rotatividade mais frequente quando as empresas adquiridas revelaram, anteriormente ao takeover, desempenhos menos satisfatórios do que as demais empresas na sua indústria. Às aquisições hostis é também atribuído um papel disciplinador relevante quando mecanismos internos de governo das sociedades, como o sejam o conselho de administração, falham no controle de comportamentos não maximizadores de valor por parte dos gestores (JENSEN, 1986;SHIVDASANI, 1993).…”
Section: Controle Pelo Mercado De Capitaisunclassified