2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2020.105907
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Board effectiveness: Evidence from firm risk

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
13
0
1

Year Published

2021
2021
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 12 publications
(14 citation statements)
references
References 42 publications
0
13
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…They use a sample of firms in 41 economies from 1990 to 2012 to demonstrate that board reforms such as increasing the number of nonexecutive directors, mitigate agency problems and improve board oversight function. Baulkaran and Bhattarai (2020) find a negative relationship between board effectivenessmeasured as a number of executive directors to total board size, independent directors to total board size, board decision-making process and board systemand firm risk. They attribute their results to the important role of board effectiveness in reducing agency cost through the separation of ownership from control and an overall reduction in the firms' cost of capital.…”
Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 84%
“…They use a sample of firms in 41 economies from 1990 to 2012 to demonstrate that board reforms such as increasing the number of nonexecutive directors, mitigate agency problems and improve board oversight function. Baulkaran and Bhattarai (2020) find a negative relationship between board effectivenessmeasured as a number of executive directors to total board size, independent directors to total board size, board decision-making process and board systemand firm risk. They attribute their results to the important role of board effectiveness in reducing agency cost through the separation of ownership from control and an overall reduction in the firms' cost of capital.…”
Section: Review Of Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 84%
“…However, the situation is different from the sector perspective. The findings of Baulkaran and Bhattarai [68] imply that the optimal board size depends on the industry affiliation. Following this line of reasoning, we expect that companies from the very specific sector (i.e., energy), which are exposed to similar market forces, legal requirements, and macroeconomic risks, will be characterized by a similar optimal board size.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Firms with complex business activities, which have great advising requirements, may benefit from large boards. Baulkaran and Bhattarai [68] report for Canadian firms that in the 2003-2010 period, the average bard size is about ten directors, but energy sector and mining companies are characterized by smaller boards, while firms from the financial sector have typically larger boards.…”
Section: Board Sizementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is in accordance with the best international practices of governing an entity. Unfortunately, a problem occurs when risk seeking managers choose to pursue selfish, greedy and personal objectives at the expense of the interests of the risk-neutral shareholders (Baulkaran & Bhattarai, 2020). Chances of moral hazards occurring increase due to the rise of opportunistic behavior of self-interest start to be the guide for managers (Ballwieser et al, 2012).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%