Board Independence and Corporate Misconduct: A Cross-National Meta-Analysis

Neville, François; Byron, Kris; Post, Corinne; Ward, Ashley J. W.

doi:10.1177/0149206318801999

Cited by 119 publications

(117 citation statements)

References 145 publications

(204 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

111

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Active board monitoring may reduce CEOs' discretion (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2015;Neville, Byron, Post, & Ward, 2018). To induce effective monitoring, however, it is often necessary that directors possess strong incentives (e.g., ownership positions) and relevant experiences (e.g., CSR expertise).…”

Section: Corporate Governance and Cognitive Biasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling

Sauerwald

2019

Corporate Governance

115

128

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research question/issue This study examines whether there is decoupling between how firms communicate about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and what firms do in terms of CSR. We argue that this CSR decoupling is driven by the CEOs' cognitive biases. Specifically, we propose that overconfident CEOs increase CSR decoupling. Research findings/insights We tested our arguments in a sample of S&P 500 firms for the period of 2006–2014. We find that CEO overconfidence is positively related to the decoupling between the optimistic tone of CSR reporting and the firm's actual corporate social performance. However, the board of directors mitigates the effect of CEO overconfidence on CSR decoupling when outside directors have CSR expertise and ownership incentives. Theoretical/academic implications Previous studies have suggested that CSR decoupling is a function of opportunistic management that can be constrained by external monitoring. We examine CSR decoupling as a function of cognitive biases (such as overconfidence) that can be constrained by internal monitoring. Practitioner/policy implications This study provides insights into the conditions when CSR information released by the firm is symbolic. Practitioners may prevent such symbolic CSR reporting by imposing effective oversight by the board of directors.

show abstract

Section: Corporate Governance and Cognitive Biasesmentioning

confidence: 99%

CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling

Sauerwald

2019

Corporate Governance

115

128

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…and (2) What are the conditions that render such monitoring more effective? We argue that just as specific board structures enable firms to be socially and environmentally responsible (Walls, Berrone and Phan, ), boards are directly accountable for related irresponsible behaviours (Neville et al ., ). Adopting a stakeholder‐agency lens (Hill and Jones, ), we investigate the impact of a specific board‐level governance bundle – board size, board independence, board CSR committee, gender diversity and director activity – on CSiR.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…In this manner, we offer a more objective and unbiased measure of CSiR over prior studies, by investigating the direct economic impact of irresponsible behaviours. In addition, we also investigate the conditions under which boards are more effective in reducing such behaviours, adding more nuance to the antecedents of CSiR (Neville et al ., ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

See 1 more Smart Citation

When Boards Matter: The Case of Corporate Social Irresponsibility

Jain

Zaman

2019

British J of Management

172

143

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While academic research has made remarkable progress in understanding corporate social responsibility (CSR), we have scant understanding of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). This paper adopts a stakeholder‐agency perspective towards CSiR to ask two related questions: (1) What board‐level structures can monitor management to reduce CSiR? and (2) What are the conditions that render board monitoring more effective? Employing a unique objective measure of CSiR and a sophisticated system generalized method of moments with dynamic panel model on a sample of publicly listed firms in the USA between 2002 and 2015, this paper demonstrates how firms with a specific board‐level governance bundle (i.e. a large, more independent board, with a board CSR committee, a higher proportion of women within boards with frequent director activity) are better equipped to reduce irresponsible behaviours, both in terms of number of irresponsible incidents as well as in terms of their economic costs to the firm. Moreover, the effectiveness of this governance bundle sustains under conditions of high institutional ownership and high board remuneration. This paper has implications for CSR and corporate governance literatures, as well as for managers and policymakers.

show abstract

“…Therefore, investors are highly attentive to securities fraud. In addition, investigating what affects corporate misconduct (including securities fraud) is an important topic in governance research because effective governance is partly designed to prevent corporate misconduct (Mohliver, 2019;Neville, Byron, Post, & Ward, 2019;Schnatterly, Gangloff, & Tuschke, 2018;Zorn, Shropshire, Martin, Combs, & Ketchen, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

Shi

Aguilera

Wang

2020

Corporate Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Research question/issue This study attempts to shed new light on how the state as a controlling shareholder can affect the interests of minority shareholders by investigating the role of state ownership in deterring securities fraud commission. Research findings/insights Using archival data from a large sample of Chinese publicly traded firms, we uncover that state ownership is negatively associated with the likelihood of securities fraud commission. Further, CEO political background reinforces this negative relationship. We also uncover that firms with high state ownership are more likely to dismiss CEOs than those with low or no state ownership upon securities fraud detection. Theoretical/academic implications Departing from agency theory‐centric research on state ownership and corporate governance, this study introduces a political governance perspective to unpack the role of state ownership in corporate governance. Political governance refers to organizational control mechanisms deployed by political actors to achieve their objectives. Practitioner/policy implications Studying how political governance systems influence managerial behaviors is critical to gaining a complete insight into the implications of state ownership on corporate governance.

show abstract

Board Independence and Corporate Misconduct: A Cross-National Meta-Analysis

Cited by 119 publications

References 145 publications

CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling

CEO overconfidence and CSR decoupling

When Boards Matter: The Case of Corporate Social Irresponsibility

State ownership and securities fraud: A political governance perspective

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About