Board Rudiments and the Executive Attitude Towards Corporate Risk-Taking

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of key board distinctiveness on managerial risk-taking behaviour. Using a total sample of 121 firms made up of 1,166 corporate directors and 847 firm-year observations, the study finds robust evidence across the three stages of estimation that suggests power separation in terms of CEO non-duality is negatively associated with executive risk-taking due to enhanced board assertiveness and independence. Board size is inversely associated with the variability of market value measure both within and at inter-firm levels. With average board membership in the study sample made up of 10 directors, the study finds crucial empirical evidence that points to the key benefits of large board configuration including the social capital, diversity of thoughts, knowledge, and experience, effectiveness and vigilance which curtails executive entrenchment. In contrast, the paper records positive association between the presence of foreign directors and corporate risk-taking. Due to their wealth of experiences, foreign directors tend to have more strategic sense of purpose and are likely not to hesitate in taking appropriate risk decisions when it really matters. While the paper finds little evidence that suggests a within-firm positive relationship between board independence and managerial risky propensities, there was no evidence found to indicate that board quality and ethnic diversity affects corporate risk-taking.

Neoliberal corporate governance mechanisms

“…From the specific perspective, corporate governance is defined as the "mechanisms" through which share owners protect their holdings in corporations (Lawal, 2018;Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This definition, which aligns with the shareholder value advocates, sees the concept as the means through which the "agency problem" is resolved in favor of the shareholder.…”