Body Biasing Injection Attacks in Practice

Beringuier-Boher, Noemie; Lacruche, Marc; El-Baze, David; Dutertre, Jean-Max; Rigaud, Jean-Baptiste; Maurine, Philippe

doi:10.1145/2858930.2858940

Cited by 18 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Finally, the skills and knowledge required to perform them also can be easily and quickly acquired [19]. From the approach perspective, semi-invasive attacks could be performed using a variety of tools such as IR light [20], X-rays [1] and other sources of ionizing radiation, electromagnetic fields [21], and body biasing [22].…”

Section: Fault Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fast Characterization Method for Semi-invasive Fault Injection Attacks

Ribera²,

Beringuier-Boher³

et al. 2020

Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020

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Semi-invasive fault injection attacks are powerful techniques well-known by attackers and secure embedded system designers. When performing such attacks, the selection of the fault injection parameters is of utmost importance and usually based on the experience of the attacker. Surprisingly, there exists no formal and general approach to characterize the target behavior under attack. In this work, we present a novel methodology to perform a fast characterization of the fault injection impact on a target, depending on the possible attack parameters. We experimentally show our methodology to be a successful one when targeting different algorithms such as DES and AES encryption and then extend to the full characterization with the help of deep learning. Finally, we show how the characterization results are transferable between different targets.

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Section: Fault Injection Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fast Characterization Method for Semi-invasive Fault Injection Attacks

Ribera²,

Beringuier-Boher³

et al. 2020

Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2020

Self Cite

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“…This change is truly drastic 1 . This fantastic rate of innovation has been sustained accurately for 50 years 2 . Therefore, a natural question is thus to re-evaluate the potential of physical attacks given so many changes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Impacts of Technology Trends on Physical Attacks?

Maurine

Guilley

2017

Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design

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Chip fabrication technologies evolve at an explosive rate. Notwithstanding, we analyze that attacks on smartcard chips are almost not impacted: only the architecture which gets more complex (e.g., the devices transition from mono-to multi-core) and the advanced design solutions (adaptative voltage and frequency scaling, multiple clock domains, asynchronicity, etc.) somehow make attacks slightly more complex. The situation is different for chips tightly integrated in embedded devices, such as smartphone chips. Indeed, the chips size and complexity increase drastically, and thus attacks identification phase becomes extremely hard. In addition, the chip targetted by the attacks is usually stacked with other chips (like the memory), which makes access to leakages and injection of faults a challenging task. Therefore, we conclude that there is a clear gain of security in the future to use smartphones as secure elements. Attacks at printed circuit board level associated with signal processing and machine learning could question this conclusion. Also, as a perspective, we notice that new kinds of attacks become possible on smartphones. Those devices being intrinsically connected, the new side-channel and fault injection attacks are realized not physically, but in software (controlled from an external center attack process): such attacks are called microarchitectural cache timing attacks (regarding side-channels) and RowHammer attacks (regarding fault injections). We predict increasing progress in those cyberattack threats.

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“…Characterizing ISA faults is an interesting approach when you have no access to the hardware IP. Another approach [4,9] is to focus on characterizing faults at the level of transistors and logic gates.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electromagnetic fault injection against a complex CPU, toward new micro-architectural fault models

et al. 2021

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The last years have seen the emergence of fault attacks targeting modern central processing units (CPUs). These attacks are analyzed at a very high abstraction level and, due to the modern CPUs complexity, the underlying fault effect is usually unknown. Recently, a few articles have focused on characterizing faults on modern CPUs.In this article, we focus on the electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) characterization on a bare-metal implementation. With this approach, we discover and understand new effects on micro-architectural subsystems. We target the BCM2837 where we successfully demonstrate persistent faults on L1 instruction cache, L1 data cache and L2 cache. We also show that faults can corrupt the memory management unit (MMU). To validate our fault model, we realize a persistent fault analysis to retrieve an AES key.

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Body Biasing Injection Attacks in Practice

Cited by 18 publications

References 8 publications

A Fast Characterization Method for Semi-invasive Fault Injection Attacks

A Fast Characterization Method for Semi-invasive Fault Injection Attacks

Impacts of Technology Trends on Physical Attacks?

Electromagnetic fault injection against a complex CPU, toward new micro-architectural fault models

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