“…Most areas of psychology have been built upon similar fundamental distinctions between actions that appear automatic, inflexible and can be handled by relatively unintelligent neural mechanisms and those that appear consciously willed, which involve intelligent selection between competing decisional alternatives, and require highly sophisticated neural processes . This dichotomy between "automatic" and "voluntary" processes remains embedded in many contemporary articles across a variety of disciplines-for example, in spatial attention (Barbot, Landy, & Carrasco, 2012;Chica, Bartolomeo, & Lupiáñez, 2013;Ibos, Duhamel, & Ben Hamed, 2013;Macaluso & Doricchi, 2013;McAuliffe, Johnson, Weaver, Deller-Quinn, & Hansen, 2013;Mysore & Knudsen, 2013; D. T. Smith, Schenk, & Rorden, 2012), temporal attention (Lawrence & Klein, 2013), cognition (Lifshitz, Bonn, Fischer, Kashem, & Raz, 2013), motor cueing (Martín-Arévalo, Kingstone, & Lupiáñez, 2013), reading (Feng, 2012), perception (Pfister, Heinemann, Kiesel, Thomaschke, & Janczyk, 2012;Spence & Deroy, 2013), social cognition/perception (Laidlaw, Risko, & Kingstone, 2012), or emotion regulation (R. Viviani, 2013). Similarly, "voluntary" and "automatic" actions are clearly distinguished in clinical literature, for conditions ranging from deafness (Bottari, Valsecchi, & Pavani, 2012), to Parkinson's disease (D'Ostilio, Cremers, Delvaux, Sadzot, & Garraux, 2013;van Stockum, MacAskill, & Anderson, 2012;van Stockum, Ma-cAskill, Myall, & Anderson, 2013;Vervoort et al, 2013), Huntington's disease (Patel, Jankovic, Hood, Jeter, & Sereno, 2012), autism (Vernazza-Martin, Longuet, Chamot, & Orève, 2013), and mild traumatic brain injury (Zhang, Red, Lin, Patel, & Sereno, 2013).…”