Body schematics: On the role of the body schema in embodied lexical–semantic representations

Abstract

a b s t r a c tWords denoting manipulable objects activate sensorimotor brain areas, likely reflecting action experience with the denoted objects. In particular, these sensorimotor lexical representations have been found to reflect the way in which an object is used. In the current paper we present data from two experiments (one behavioral and one neuroimaging) in which we investigate whether body schema information, putatively necessary for interacting with functional objects, is also recruited during lexical processing. To this end, we presented participants with words denoting objects that are typically brought towards or away from the body (e.g., cup or key, respectively). We hypothesized that objects typically brought to a location on the body (e.g., cup) are relatively more reliant on body schema representations, since the final goal location of the cup (i.e., the mouth) is represented primarily through posture and body coordinates. In contrast, objects typically brought to a location away from the body (e.g., key) are relatively more dependent on visuo-spatial representations, since the final goal location of the key (i.e., a keyhole) is perceived visually. The behavioral study showed that prior planning of a movement along an axis towards and away from the body facilitates processing of words with a congruent action semantic feature (i.e., preparation of movement towards the body facilitates processing of cup.). In an fMRI study we showed that words denoting objects brought towards the body engage the resources of brain areas involved in the processing information about human bodies (i.e., the extra-striate body area, middle occipital gyrus and inferior parietal lobe) relatively more than words denoting objects typically brought away from the body. The results provide converging evidence that body schema are implicitly activated in processing lexical information.

Physics instruction induces changes in neural knowledge representation during successive stages of learning

“…The increase in stable voxels in the right pre-and postcentral gyri in the final thinking trials is consistent with activation in motor areas while imagining motor interaction with an object (Just, 2008;Kemmerer et al, 2008;Rueschemeyer et al, 2010). Along with the motor regions, the final representation of the mechanical systems included a large frontal component.…”

“…A set of eight potential cognitive processes, which have previously been associated with cortical systems, are postulated to correspond to regions or small sets of regions (networks) involved in understanding how mechanical systems work. These eight processes (and postulated cortical systems) consist of: (1) mental animation (bilateral parietal: Boronat et al, 2005), (2) causal reasoning (right temporo-parietal and medial prefrontal: Mason and Just, 2011), (3) embodied cognition (preand post-central: Rueschemeyer et al, 2010), (4) semantic knowledge (left temporal: Price, 2000), (5) language in context (bilateral inferior frontal: Mestres-Missé et al, 2008), (6) biological/goal-directed motion (right temporal: Pelphrey et al, 2003), (7) rule learning (middle and superior frontal: Bunge, 2004), and (8) visual processing (occipital cortex). The contributions of these various systems might be expected to shift as the instruction and learning progresses.…”

Uncovering the architecture of action semantics.

“…Furthermore, objects typically used near the body (e.g., “cup”) evoke different patterns of neural activity than objects used away from the body (e.g., “key”) (Rüschemeyer, Pfeiffer, & Bekkering, 2010). …”

Toward a brain-based componential semantic representation

“…Some action verbs (give, punch, tell, throw) indicate movement or relocation of something away from the self, whereas others (acquire, catch, receive, eat) indicate movement or relocation toward the self. This distinction may also modulate the representation of objects that characteristically move toward or away from the self (Rueschemeyer, Pfeiffer, & Bekkering, 2010).…”