2016
DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1152987
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Boko Haram's attacks and the people's response: A ‘fourth pillar’ of the responsibility to protect?

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Cited by 10 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The devastating impacts of the activities of Boko Haram extend beyond the borders of Nigeria into neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. For example, huge death tolls, loss of properties and disruption of economic activities has been explored (Hansen, 2017;Mbah, Mwangwu & Ede, 2017;Opoku, Sakah & Alupo, 2017;Popovski & Maiangwa, 2016;Weeraratne, 2017). At some point, they were described as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world due to the rate at which they killed people in the region (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The devastating impacts of the activities of Boko Haram extend beyond the borders of Nigeria into neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. For example, huge death tolls, loss of properties and disruption of economic activities has been explored (Hansen, 2017;Mbah, Mwangwu & Ede, 2017;Opoku, Sakah & Alupo, 2017;Popovski & Maiangwa, 2016;Weeraratne, 2017). At some point, they were described as the most dangerous terrorist group in the world due to the rate at which they killed people in the region (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Studies by Bappah (2016) Ogbonaya, Ogujiuba, and Stiegler (2016) and Botha and Abdile (2019), examined the challenges of regional cooperation in West Africa, especially in combating the Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria, ranging from the lack of a clear-cut security policy and framework in dealing with the menace, to the non-commitment and lack of political will from member states to ensure the activities of the group are contained, and the lack of an effective operational strategy and standby-force as plausible factors militating sub-regional security cooperation in the counterinsurgent efforts against the organization. Other research (Maiangwa, 2013;Edward & Kwabena, 2015;Olumuyiwa & Maiangwa 2017b;Onapajo, Uzodike & Whetho, 2012;Popovski & Maiangwa, 2016;Umokoro, 2016;Kallon, 2017), has captured the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency at the various levels and sectors of society and the various regional and sub-regional responses by these regional and subregional actors in containing the threats posed by the continued presence and activities of this group.…”
Section: Boko Haram: Theoretical Discussion and Review Of Existing Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This alliance has conducted several operations against Boko Haram since January 2015, resulting in the recapture of areas previously controlled by the group and the disruption of its operations. According to the Nigerian government, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) successfully regained control of 36 towns in three different states during the months of February and March 2015 (Popovski & Maiangwa, 2016;Hassan, 2021). Despite these successes, however, the MNJTF has faced obstacles such as a lack of coordination and cooperation among its member states, as well as funding and logistical problems that have hampered its ability to fully carry out its mandate (Agbiboa, 2017).…”
Section: Source: Authormentioning
confidence: 99%