2018
DOI: 10.1080/1057610x.2018.1442141
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Boko Haram's Conquest for the Caliphate: How Al Qaeda Helped Islamic State Acquire Territory

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Cited by 29 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…Operating from the region's porous borderlands, Boko Haram reportedly established relationships with other Islamist groups in Africa including Mali's Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its splinter group the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (ICG 2010; Zenn 2013). These links have given Boko Haram access to weapons, including those made available from Libya's collapse.…”
Section: Case Studies: the Rtf And The Mnjtfmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Operating from the region's porous borderlands, Boko Haram reportedly established relationships with other Islamist groups in Africa including Mali's Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and its splinter group the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (ICG 2010; Zenn 2013). These links have given Boko Haram access to weapons, including those made available from Libya's collapse.…”
Section: Case Studies: the Rtf And The Mnjtfmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This could be seen through the negative teachings given by Mohammed Yusuf to his followers that Islam abhors 'Western civilization' and all its imprints (see Umar 2012, p. 144). Such messages increasingly created the false perception that Western civilization is anti-Islamic and most of the problems affecting the society are linked with the saturation of Western values in Nigerian society (Hansen 2017;Zenn 2018). These negative misrepresentations and the instrumentalization of religion encouraged individuals to join Boko Haram.…”
Section: Terrorist Recruitment: Conceptual Clarification and Theoretimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The group was non-violent between 2003 and 2009 and was based in the railway quarters in Maiduguri in Borno state, which subsequently became its operational headquarters [10,12]. Members and sympathizers of the group were first portrayed as either young Islamist activists, a largely peaceful Islamic dissident sect, a peaceful Islamic splinter group, or students from the city of Maiduguri who preached a cultural revolution, which implies that the group was primarily not violent [13]. The group gradually became violent, and Voll [14] argues that even though this trend of violence is seen by most Nigerians as being outside of acceptable Islamic traditions, it follows a long tradition of violence by militant jihad in West and Central Africa.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%