Bolsa Família, poverty and inequality: Political and economic effects in the short and long run

Abstract

Created in 2003 by the unification of four earlier initiatives, Bolsa Família currently provides cash transfers to 13 million people and supports more than one-third of the children that go to primary school in Brazil. This article extends and expands previous reviews on the origins, development and impact of the programme. The authors consider the political and economic dimensions in their evaluation of Bolsa Família's contribution to the reduction of poverty and inequality. They argue that Bolsa Família's ultimate impact will partly depend on a reduction of inequalities in public provision of health and education, which in turn may require a more active political role for the poor.

Coverage and equity in reproductive and maternal health interventions in Brazil: impressive progress following the implementation of the Unified Health System

“…Later, the Programa Bolsa Família , a conditional cash transfer program, unified several social benefit initiatives in one large program designed to provide extra cash to the poorest families in the country, conditional on use of health services by children and on regular school attendance. The program was successful in reducing income inequality [11], contributing to a significant decrease in childhood mortality, especially from poverty-related causes such as malnutrition and diarrhea [12]. In parallel, the country went through a period of rapid economic changes, with the control of hyperinflation in 1994, and strong economic growth between 2004 and 2011.…”

Social Policy for Neoliberalism: The Bolsa Família Programme in Brazil

“…Finally, PETI (Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil, or Programme of Elimination of Child Labour, managed by the Ministry of Labour) paid poor families to send their children to school instead of working. It soon became apparent that these programmes were poorly funded, plagued by competition, and had managerial difficulties across the federal, state and municipal levels (Sánchez‐Ancochea and Mattei, : 302).…”

“…These difficulties tend to increase over time . Finally, PBF has failed to reach 3 million eligible families, perhaps because they are unable or unwilling to apply due to income volatility or fear of stigmatization (Lavinas, : 28; Mattei, : 170, Sánchez‐Ancochea and Mattei, : 305; Soares et al., : 19). Targeting undermines social cohesion. It bypasses organizations with a legitimate stake in social provision (trade unions, research institutions, NGOs and community associations), validates ideologically driven limitations on welfare spending, and compels the poor to manage their own dispossession while threatening to deprive them of civic rights unless they meet extraneous conditions (Freeland, : 77; Sen, : 13‒14).…”

“…These difficulties tend to increase over time . Finally, PBF has failed to reach 3 million eligible families, perhaps because they are unable or unwilling to apply due to income volatility or fear of stigmatization (Lavinas, : 28; Mattei, : 170, Sánchez‐Ancochea and Mattei, : 305; Soares et al., : 19).…”

Illusory Debates

“…Scholars have examined this concerted "return to social policy" (Razavi, 2007) through two oppositional analytical frameworks. Some have argued that these social programmes signal the co-optation of a concern for welfare within a neoliberal logic (Barrientos, 2013;Bradshaw, 2008;Sanchez-Ancochea and Mattei, 2011), while others have posited that these new programmes signal the creation of an alternative to, or perhaps even a transition away from neoliber alism (Abrahamson, 2010;Jenson, 2010;Kaltwaser, 2011;Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). W hereas the former claim th at these social programmes should not be taken as signalling the transition to a post-neoliberal era, the latter have cau tiously welcomed such a possibility.…”