“…Nevertheless, more recent studies recognize the strategic nature of the default event and find that both equity holders and debt holders can have incentives to 1 Various modifications and extensions on the debt structure, default triggering mechanism, firm value dynamics, and implementation procedures have been proposed in the literature. Prominent examples include Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Ho and Singer (1982), Ronn and Verma (1986), Titman and Torous (1989) Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994Leland ( , 1998, , Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996), Leland and Toft (1996), Briys and de Varenne (1997), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) Garbade (1999), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Duffie and Lando (2001), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Zhou (2001), Acharya and Carpenter (2002), Huang and Huang (2003), Hull, Nelken, and White (2004), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2007), Buraschi, Trojani, and AndreaVedolin (2007), Chen, CollinDufresne, and Goldstein (2008), and Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008).induce or force bankruptcy well before the equity value completely vanishes. Theoretical work on strategic default includes Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), , Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007), and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007).…”