1982
DOI: 10.1016/0304-405x(82)90017-4
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Bond indenture provisions and the risk of corporate debt

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Cited by 71 publications
(28 citation statements)
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“…Nevertheless, more recent studies recognize the strategic nature of the default event and find that both equity holders and debt holders can have incentives to 1 Various modifications and extensions on the debt structure, default triggering mechanism, firm value dynamics, and implementation procedures have been proposed in the literature. Prominent examples include Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Ho and Singer (1982), Ronn and Verma (1986), Titman and Torous (1989) Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994Leland ( , 1998, , Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996), Leland and Toft (1996), Briys and de Varenne (1997), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) Garbade (1999), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Duffie and Lando (2001), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Zhou (2001), Acharya and Carpenter (2002), Huang and Huang (2003), Hull, Nelken, and White (2004), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2007), Buraschi, Trojani, and AndreaVedolin (2007), Chen, CollinDufresne, and Goldstein (2008), and Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008).induce or force bankruptcy well before the equity value completely vanishes. Theoretical work on strategic default includes Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), , Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007), and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, more recent studies recognize the strategic nature of the default event and find that both equity holders and debt holders can have incentives to 1 Various modifications and extensions on the debt structure, default triggering mechanism, firm value dynamics, and implementation procedures have been proposed in the literature. Prominent examples include Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Ho and Singer (1982), Ronn and Verma (1986), Titman and Torous (1989) Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland (1994Leland ( , 1998, , Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996), Leland and Toft (1996), Briys and de Varenne (1997), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) Garbade (1999), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Duffie and Lando (2001), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Zhou (2001), Acharya and Carpenter (2002), Huang and Huang (2003), Hull, Nelken, and White (2004), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2007), Buraschi, Trojani, and AndreaVedolin (2007), Chen, CollinDufresne, and Goldstein (2008), and Cremers, Driessen, and Maenhout (2008).induce or force bankruptcy well before the equity value completely vanishes. Theoretical work on strategic default includes Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), , Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007), and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…James (1987) concluded the importance of maturity from three aspects. First, short term debt contains less risk compare to long term debt and there is a positive relation between the time to maturity of the debt and the elasticity of the value of the bond by holding market value of debt constant (Merton, 1974, Ho andSinger, 1982). Second, according to Flannery (1986), firms' choices of maturity could signal the market about the firms' management assessment of earnings prospects, and firms' that believe the assets are undervalued prefer a short term debt to reveal the true prospects.…”
Section: Maturitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this setting, the claimholder conflict is the potential for dilution of public bond claims by private debt claims (bank loans) that are not disclosed. The conflict can be severe in this setting because bank debt generally has higher priority in terms of both explicit contractual provisions (see, Barclay and Smith (1995b)) and higher effective priority in time than public bonds (see, e.g., Ho and Singer (1982); Barclay and Smith (1995a)). Therefore, issuing bank loans by municipal entities after the public bonds have been issued dilutes the cash flow claims of existing bond holders.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%