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Eshleman, Matthew C.; Hamm, Eric; Sommerlatte, Curtis; Hoven, Adrian van den; Lejman, Michael; Perpich, Diane

doi:10.3167/ssi.2016.220207

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“…Kruks is not alone in reading Sartrean freedom as something that does not admit of degrees; claims such as “I am absolutely free” (Sartre, 2003, p. 530) make it easy to see why. However, in this piece Kruks does not consider the possibility that Sartre himself saw ‘absolute freedom’ as an indefensible position—or the claims of Sartre scholars that if we read Sartre charitably, he himself rejects it 500 pages into Being and Nothingness , after giving up his methodological solipsism (see Eshleman, 2009, 2010). Eshleman, while endorsing the spirit of efforts to defend Beauvoir's philosophical value, claims that the lack of “any serious study of Sartre's influence on Beauvoir” runs the risk of overstating Beauvoir's influence on Sartre (2009: 65‐66).…”

Section: Freedom and Situation: Beauvoirian Critiquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beauvoir and Sartre's “disagreement” about freedom

Kirkpatrick

2023

Philosophy Compass

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The French existentialists Simone de Beauvoir and Jean‐Paul Sartre are renowned philosophers of freedom. But what “existentialist freedom” is is a matter of disagreement amongst their interpreters and, some argue, between Beauvoir and Sartre themselves. Since the late 1980s several scholars have argued that a Sartrean conception of freedom cannot justify the ethics of existentialism, adequately account for situations of oppression, or serve feminist ends. On these readings, Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about freedom—making existentialist ethics, resistance to oppression, and feminism coherently defensible. This article identifies four conceptions of freedom in order to clarify the questions of whether and how they disagreed, arguing that some incompatibilist readings of Sartre and Beauvoir conflate or confuse these conceptions in ways that render their conclusions unconvincing. However, there are stronger grounds on which to claim that Beauvoir disagreed with Sartre about morality—and the conditions of its possibility.

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Section: Freedom and Situation: Beauvoirian Critiquesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beauvoir and Sartre's “disagreement” about freedom

Kirkpatrick

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Book Reviews

Cited by 1 publication

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Beauvoir and Sartre's “disagreement” about freedom

Beauvoir and Sartre's “disagreement” about freedom

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